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THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
STUART P. GREEN*
In this Article, Stuart Green argues that when local govern-
ments adopt policies resulting in official acts that violate federal
criminal law, such entities should be subject to criminal
prosecution.
The Article begins by tracing the history of local governmen-
tal liability for crimes under state law. Mr. Green shows that, in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, though both local
governments and private business corporations were immune
from prosecution for mens rea crimes, each entity could be con-
victed of non-mens rea, "public harm" offenses. He argues that,
in light of the law that now applies to private business corpora-
tions, it is an anachronism that local governments are still viewed
as incapable of forming criminal intent.
Mr. Green then argues that a collection of key federal crimi-
nal statutes involving the environment, civil rights, and antitrust
should be construed to apply to local governments. In addition,
Mr. Green suggests that, while local governments might be im-
mune from prosecution in limited circumstances, they enjoy no
immunity from prosecution generally. The Article concludes with
a discussion of the policy considerations underlying the criminal
liability of local governments.
One of the most disturbing questions raised by the infamous beating of
Rodney King is whether that beating was the act of an isolated group of city
employees or was, instead, the result of official or unofficial Los Angeles
Police Department policies.' This Article does not purport to resolve that
* Associate, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering; B.A., Tufts University (1983); J.D., Yale Univer-
sity (1988). I am grateful to Carol Lee, Lewis Grossman, Alan Untereiner, Barbara Moses,
Michael Froomkin, Ron Greene, Hardy Callcott, Michael Small, Paul Wolfson, Steve Colloton,
and Vik Amar for reading and commenting on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank the law
firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering for its support during the research and writing of this article.
1. For an example of how this issue figured in the federal trial of the case, compare Gale
Holland, SWAT Chief Defends Clubbing of King, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Mar. 20, 1993, at
A3 (reporting on defense witness testimony that official police policy on controlling unruly sus-
pects at the time of the King beating was to "beat them into submission") with Rogers Worthing-
ton, Police Expert: Many Blows to King "Flagrant," Cm. TRiB., Mar. 4, 1993, at 14 (reporting on
prosecution witness testimony that defendant officers' beating of King while he was on the ground
was clearly in violation of police department policy). See also INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE
Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION), REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES PoLicE DEPARTMENT 29-94 (1991) (finding that a significant
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difficult factual question. Instead, it offers a remedy for cases in which
prosecutors do demonstrate that acts regarded as criminal under federal law
are the consequence of policies adopted by a local government or its
2agencies.
The facts of Webster v. City of Housion,3 a 1984 case in the Fifth
Circuit, provide a vivid illustration of how municipal policies can lead to
criminal activity.4 The case involved the unlawful use of a "throw-down"
gun-an unregistered weapon carried by police and laid next to the victim
of a police shooting to make an unjustified death appear justified.5 The
evidence showed that some form of throw-down weapon was carried by, or
available to, seventy-five to eighty percent of Houston police officers; that
instructors at the police academy taught the use of such weapons; and that
Houston city officials either condoned or deliberately ignored the practice,
despite broadly worded pronouncements to the contrary.6
Houston's "policy" of condonation had tragic and appalling conse-
quences. Randy Webster, a seventeen-year-old youth from Shreveport,
Louisiana, stole a van from an automobile dealership and was pursued by
Houston police.' At the conclusion of a high speed chase, Webster "had his
hands up and was trying to get out of the stolen van, unarmed, offering no
resistance, when the police, to whom he wished to surrender, forced him to
the ground and shot him in the back of the head."8 Webster died almost
instantly.9 Nervous about the consequences of killing an unarmed teenager
who was trying to surrender, the police officers acted in accordance with
number of Los Angeles police officers repeatedly misused force despite written policy that al-
lowed officers to use only the minimum amount of force necessary to deal with credible threats, a
problem that was aggravated by racism and bias within the department).
2. Except as indicated otherwise, the terms "local government," "municipality," and "city"
are used interchangeably to refer to regional governments smaller than states. This is the usual
practice in the literature on local government law. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal
Concept, 93 HARv. L. Rnv. 1057, 1061 n.4 (1980); cf. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part 11-
Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 346-48 (1990) (commenting on the various
meanings of the term "city").
Although this Article does not directly consider whether federal and state agencies might be
subject to prosecution under federal criminal law, both issues are referred to below. See infra note
107.
3. 735 F.2d 838 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (en banc), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 739 F.2d
993 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (en banc).
4. Although the case involved a private claim for punitive and compensatory damages, id. at
843, the facts could just as easily have provided the basis for federal criminal prosecution.
5. Id.
6. Webster v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 1220, 1232 (5th Cir. 1982) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring), vacated and remanded, 735 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (en banc), affid in part
and rev'd in part, 739 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (en banc).
7. Id. at 1232 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
8. Id. (Goldberg, J., concurring).
9. Id. (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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what was, in effect, Houston Police Department policy: They planted a
throw-down gun near Webster's corpse and formed a plan to perjure them-
selves in any future proceedings."0
This Article argues that in cases like Webster, in which local govern-
ments and their agencies intentionally adopt policies that authorize, en-
courage, or condone acts that are properly treated as criminal under federal
law, those entities (rather than, or in addition to, the officials who work for
them) can and, in some cases, should be criminally prosecuted." The argu-
ment proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the extensive nineteenth and
early twentieth century precedent for the state criminal prosecution of local
municipalities.' 2 Part II shows that much of the statutory and doctrinal ap-
paratus for the prosecution of such entities already exists under federal
law.' 3 Part III argues that such prosecutions would, in appropriate cases,
fairly and efficiently promote important federal criminal law interests with-
out unduly harming local governments or their citizens. 4
The time for such an argument is ripe. 5 Municipal governments now
regularly authorize conduct that, if engaged in by private individuals or cor-
porations, would violate criminal law. A recent article regarding the Dis-
trict of Columbia, for example, has described a "heartless, incompetent
government that systematically screws its neediest out of legally required
entitlements and basic city services[,] . . .ignores local laws, disregards
federal statutes, and tramples basic constitutional rights."' 6 And the prob-
lem is not limited to instances of police brutality and other civil rights viola-
10. Id. (Goldberg, J., concurring).
11. For a discussion of the factors that should be considered in deciding whether to prosecute
the entity alone or both the entity and the responsible officials, see infra note 228.
12. See infra notes 21-100 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 101-214 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 215-73 and accompanying text.
15. There appear to be only a handful of prior discussions of this subject: James D. Barnett,
The Criminal Liability of American Municipal Corporations, 17 OR. L. REv. 289 (1938) (dealing
primarily with the history of such prosecutions under state law); 1 KATHLEEN F. BRmcKEy, CoRPO-
RATE CRIMINAL LABIurrY §§ 2:05-:07 (2d ed. 1992) (recognizing importance of such prosecu-
tions to the development of corporate criminal liability); WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A
CHANGING SocimY 211 (1972) (offering a broad policy argument in favor of prosecuting govern-
mental agencies); 17 EUGENE McQUILLN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 49.88-
49.94.50 (3d ed. rev. vol. 1993) (collecting cases).
16. David Plotz, Guilty! Guilty! Guilty!, WASH. CrIY PAPER, March 25, 1994, at 22; see also
WASHINGTON LEGAL CLINIC FOR THE HOMELESS, COLD, HARSH, AND UNENDING RESISTANCE:
THE DISTRIcr OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT'S HIDDEN WAR AGAINST ITS POOR AND HOMELESS
passim (1993) (describing pervasive pattern in which D.C. city government systematically violates
laws concerning homelessness, mental health, prison conditions, public housing, foster care, and
other public benefits).
For a general assessment of the causes and extent of police brutality in this country, see
JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYF, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE ExCESSIVE USE OF
FORCE passim (1993).
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tions. There are also indications that local governments are among the
nation's worst polluters 17 and that they engage in serious per se antitrust
violations."
These three areas of the criminal law-civil rights, environmental, and
antitrust-are the focus of much of this Article. The reason for this focus is
that these crimes seem more likely than crimes such as bribery, fraud, and
racketeering to result from the collective decisionmaking process that justi-
fies prosecuting the entity rather than, or in addition to, the individual. 19
This Article does not attempt to quantify or systematically identify
particular instances of "municipal crime." It accepts as a premise that such
crime occurs and that it is sometimes the result of official or unofficial
municipal policy. The Article also does not offer an argument as to why
certain serious cases of civil rights, environmental, and antitrust illegality
should be addressed through federal criminal sanctions; it simply adopts
Congress's judgment that they should.20 Instead, the Article seeks to estab-
lish that the policies which recommend the use of criminal sanctions when
17. See Steven Ferrey, The Toxic Time Bomb: Municipal Liability for the Cleanup of Haz-
ardous Waste, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197, 200-02 (1988). State and federal governmental enti-
ties have also been identified as major polluters. See, e.g., SETH SHnUMAN, THE THREAT AT
HOME: CONFRONTING THE Toxic LEGACY OF THE U.S. MiLrrARY passim (1992); Bruce van
Voorst, A Thousand Points of Blight, TimE, Nov. 9, 1992, at 68.
18. See generally MARK R. LEE, ANTrUST LAW AND LocAL GOVERNMENT 47-165 (1985)
(discussing local government antitrust violations, including such per se violations as price fixing);
Stephen D. Susman & William H. White, The Perspective of a Plaintiffs Lawyer, in ANwrrrRusT
AND LOCAL GovERNMEm: PERSPECTIVES ON THE Bour.OE DEcisION 21, 28 (James V. Siena ed.,
1982) [hereinafter ANrusT AND LOCAL GovamMmmr]. Cf. infra note 107 (discussing a fed-
eral grand jury antitrust investigation of a state university).
19. For a further discussion of why enterprise liability is more appropriate in the case of
some crimes than others, see infra note 216.
20. This Article also is not intended to advocate an expansion of federal criminal law. The
author recognizes that "overcriminalization"i-i.e., the application of the criminal laws to conduct
that has not traditionally been regarded as criminal-tends to rob the criminal law of its distinc-
tive force. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REv. 193,235-36 (1991); John
C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models-And What
Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1876 (1992) [hereinafter Coffee, Paradigms]; San-
ford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic
Regulations, 30 U. CH. L. REv. 423, 437-38 (1963); see also Naftali BenDavid, How Much More
Can Courts, Prisons Take?, LEGAL TimEs, June 7, 1993, at I (describing growing resistance to the
federalization of "petty" crimes).
Moreover, the author does not mean to suggest that municipalities should be criminally pros-
ecuted whenever the law allows, or even in every case in which a business corporation would be
prosecuted. The Article recognizes that the criminal law is an unwieldy tool for effecting social
policy, a "last resort to be used selectively and discriminatingly when other sanctions fail." Kad-
ish, supra, at 426. Indeed, the author acknowledges that this "last resort" view of criminal law
may be particularly appropriate when the defendant is a local government, given the extensive
control the federal government is able to exercise over such entities by means of "bribes" and
other forms of conditional spending. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL
GOVaRNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 534-53 (3d ed. 1990) (discussing law regarding ability of
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the defendant is a governmental official or private corporation also recom-
mend the use of criminal sanctions when the defendant is a local govern-
mental entity.
I. THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF LocAL GovERNmENTs
UNDER STATE LAW
For more than a century and a half, from about 1819 until as late as
1975, American local governments were subject to criminal prosecution
under state law." Prosecutors acting on behalf of the State filed informa-
tions, and grand juries issued indictments, setting forth criminal charges
against cities;" municipal corporations;23 towns;24 boroughs, counties,
townships, and parishes; city councils, boards of freeholders, and alder-
men;26 parks and public works authorities; v and even the "inhabitants" of a
place. It was during this same period, particularly during the middle part
of the nineteenth century, that the legal status of the municipality was trans-
formed. Once a relatively autonomous association of citizens operating ac-
cording to its own rules and frequently owning property, the municipality
changed, over time, into an inferior creature, a "mere subdivision" of the
state subject to almost complete state regulation and control.29
federal government to condition spending on state and local governments' compliance with fed-
eral policy objectives).
21. The first reported case involving the criminal prosecution of a local government seems to
have been Commonwealth v. Inhabitants of Dedham, 16 Mass. 141 (1819); the last, Common-
wealth v. Fleetwood Borough Auth., 346 A.2d 867 (Pa. Comnmw. Ct. 1975).
22. E.g., People v. City of Chicago, 100 N.E. 194 (Ill. 1912); City of Newport v. Common-
wealth, 55 S.W. 914 (Ky. 1900); State v. City of Portland, 74 Me. 268 (1883); Commonwealth v.
City of Boston, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 442 (1835); State v. Dover, 46 N.H. 452 (1866); State v.
Canterbury, 28 N.H. 195 (1854).
23. E.g., People v. Corporation of Albany, 11 Wend. 538 (N.Y. 1834); State v. Corporation
of Shelbyville, 36 Tenn. (4 Sneed) 176 (1856).
24. E.g., State v. Town of Cumberland, 6 R.I. 496 (1860); State v. Town of Burlington, 36
Vt. 521 (1864); State v. Town of Whitingham, 7 Vt. 390 (1835); Town of Byron v. State, 35 Wis.
313 (1874).
25. E.g., Commonwealth v. Lansford Borough, 14 Pa. 376 (1894); Commonwealth v. Bor-
ough of Wilkinsburg, 37 Pa. Super. 160 (1908).
26. E.g., White v. Commissioners of Chowan, 90 N.C. 437 (1884); Commonwealth v. Bre-
din, 30 A. 921 (Pa. 1895); State v. Mayor & Aldermen of Knoxville, 12 Tenn. 146 (1883).
27. E.g., State v. Commissioners of Cross Roads of Charleston, 3 S.C.L. (3 Hill) 149 (1836);
State v. Metropolitan Park Dist. of Tacoma, 171 P. 254 (Wash. 1918).
28. E.g., State v. Inhabitants of Madison, 62 Me. 546 (1874); see also Barnett, supra note 15,
at 289-306 (tracing the development of municipal liability in England and the United States); 56
AM. JUR. 2D Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions § 27 (1971)
(discussing criminal liability of municipal corporations); 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
§ 2215 (1950) (same).
29. For a discussion of this transformation, which seems to have occurred in different juris-
dictions at different times during the 19th century, see OscAR HANDLIN & MARY F. HANDLIN,
CoMMoNwEALTii: A STuDy OF Tim ROLE OF GovERNMENT IN THE AMEICAN ECONOMY 93 (rev.
ed. 1969) (dealing with Massachusetts); HENDRIK HIARoO, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE
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Unfortunately, the criminal prosecution of local governments did not
fit neatly into this transformative process. There are simply too few re-
ported cases, spread across too many jurisdictions, to justify any general
conclusions about how such prosecutions did or did not reflect this change
in legal status. 30 Instead, Part I explores three propositions that help to
illustrate, in more selective terms, how such prosecutions related to the de-
velopment of local government law in the nineteenth century.
First, the definition of what was "criminal" for municipalities was de-
rived (like much of local government law) from the more general law of
corporations.31 This definition referred not to acts requiring mens rea, but
instead to non-mens rea acts that harmed the public at large, such as the
creation of, or failure to abate, a nuisance.
Second, courts viewed state-initiated criminal prosecution as an effi-
cient alternative to private tort suits. 32 By making municipalities both liable
for criminal prosecution brought by the government and immune from tort
suits brought by a potential "multitude" of private plaintiffs, it was possible
to deter municipalities from wrongdoing without overdeterring them from
socially beneficial acts.
Third, the imposition of criminal liability frequently hinged on a deter-
mination of whether a municipality was acting in a "governmental" (rather
than "proprietary") or "discretionary" (as opposed to "ministerial") capac-
ity.33 Although these distinctions are now more familiar in the context of
private tort suits against municipalities, they had one rationale that was
unique to state criminal prosecutions: namely, that making municipalities
immune from criminal prosecution when acting in their capacity as the
POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CrrY OF NEw YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870, at 189-91
(1983) (dealing with New York); and Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the Municipal Corpora-
tion: A Case Study in Legal Change, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 369, 392-438 (1985) (comparing Massa-
chusetts to New York). See also Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. Rv. 1, 6-18 (1990) (reviewing the traditional assumption of the
legal powerlessness of local governments).
30. In each of the 12 states in which a record of such proceedings has been found, there are
no more than a handful of reported cases. See supra notes 21-28. Nevertheless, the criminal
prosecution of local governments was regularly treated in the leading 19th- and early 20th-century
treatises on both the criminal law, see I JOEL P. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW
§ 1082 (6th ed. 1877); WILLIAM L. CLARK, JR., HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 80 n.83 (1894);
HERSCHEL B. LAZELL, A TREATIsE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 113 (2d ed. 1912); 1 FRANCIS
WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW § 93 (8th ed. 1880); and local government law, see
ROGER W. COOLEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 162 (1914); 2 JOHN
F. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 745,746 (2d ed. 1873); CHARLES B. ELLI.
oTr, THE PRINCILS OF THE LAW OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS § 358 (1898).
31. See infra notes 34-59 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 69-90 and accompanying text.
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"state" would relieve the state of the possibility that it might be prosecuting
"itself."
After exploring these three propositions, the Article offers several
thoughts on why the state criminal prosecution of local government entities
occurred at all and why, during the early years of this century, such prose-
cutions virtually disappeared.
A. Municipalities as "Corporations" Subject to Prosecution for Non-
Mens Rea, Public Harm Offenses
The criminal prosecution of local governments during the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries was, in large part, a species of corporate crimi-
nal law. Cases involving the criminal liability of business corporations
were regularly cited as support in decisions and scholarly treatises involv-
ing the criminal liability of local governments34 and vice versa. 5 The close
relation between the criminal liability of municipalities and business corpo-
rations was not surprising; it reflected a broader identity between corporate
and local government law-or, more accurately, the lack of a real distinc-
tion between the two-in the early and middle part of the nineteenth cen-
tury.36 And it was a relationship that existed even though many
municipalities were technically not incorporated.
37
The basic nineteenth-century rule was that municipalities and business
corporations were immune from prosecution for crimes requiring mens
rea,38 but subject to prosecution for non-mens rea acts that harmed the pub-
lic at large.39 The emphasis on the public at large is important; acts that
34. E.g., State v. City of Portland, 74 Me. 268,273 (1883); 2 DiLLON, supra note 30, § 746 &
n.l.
35. E.g., CLARK, supra note 30, § 42 at n.83; LAZELL, supra note 30, § 111 at n.329.
36. HARTrOG, supra note 29, at 184.
37. Frug, supra note 2, at 1095.
38. See McKim v. Odom, 3 Bland 407, 421-22 (Md. 1829) (noting that "the members of a
body politic, in their corporate capacity, cannot commit a crime, or perpetrate a felony"); Com-
monwealth v. Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 339, 345 (1854) ("Corpora-
tions cannot be indicted for offences which derive their criminality from evil intention, or which
consist in a violation of those social duties which appertain to men and subjects. They cannot be
guilty of treason or felony; of perjury or offences against the person. But beyond this there is no
good reason for their exemption from the consequences of unlawful and wrongful acts committed
by their agents in pursuance of authority derived from them:'); State v. Morris & Essex R.R., 23
N.J.L. 360, 370 (1852) ("[Tlhere are crimes (perjury for example) of which a corporation cannot,
in the nature of things, be guilty. There are other crimes, such as treason or murder, for which the
punishment imposed by law cannot be inflicted upon a corporation. Nor can they be liable for any
crime of which a corrupt intent or malus animus is an essential ingredient"); WHARTON, supra
note 30, at 58; see also infra note 30.
39. 1 BisHoP, supra note 30, § 236 (arguing that "if a nuisance affects the public it is indicta-
ble, while actionable if it affects only individuals"); id. § 235, at 138 (asserting that if the "thing is
done to the injury of the whole community, and sufficient in magnitude for the tribunals to notice,
it is cognizable criminally") (footnote omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Ashley Borough, 37
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harmed only a part of the public were either not actionable or, in the case of
some types of municipality, actionable in tort.40 The reason for such a
scheme of immunity was that municipalities, like other types of corpora-
tions, were regarded as incapable of forming criminal intent and of serving
the prison sentence that was associated with mens rea crimes.41
The "public harm" requirement typically took one of two forms. First,
municipalities were subject to criminal prosecution when they actively cre-
ated a harm to the public, an offense usually referred to as misfeasance.
42
Second, they were criminally liable when they failed to carry out some
duty-usually prescribed by statute 43-that was owed to the public. Such
Pa. Super. 254, 259 (1908) (affirming conviction of town indicted for dumping sewage into a
public creek and thereby maintaining a public nuisance; to the extent that a downstream property
owner would suffer harm "not because he happens to be a riparian owner, but because he is a
citizen, a unit in the community, with the right to demand that the health and comfort of that
community shall not be threatened or impaired," the proper remedy is by "public prosecution");
State v. Mayor and Aldermen of Knoxville, 12 Tenn. 146, 156 (1883) (reversing conviction of
town that sought to protect interests of the community at large by burning smallpox-infested cloth-
ing and bed linens, even though such burning did cause temporary inconvenience to relatively
small group of persons who lived nearby).
For a further discussion of strict liability or "regulatory" crimes in the 19th century, see
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HIsToRY 113-16 (1993); Harry
V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Eco-
nomic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REv. 197, 212-16 (1965); Francis B. Sayre,
Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM L. REv. 55, 56-67 (1933).
40. See, e.g., Ashley Borough, 37 Pa. Super. at 260 (stating that to the extent a downstream
property owner suffered an injury which would be particular to him, and would not "affect the
people at large," his remedy was by civil tort action); HARTOG, supra note 29, at 189 (maintaining
that municipal corporations could be held liable in tort, while unincorporated municipalities could
not).
41. CLARK, supra note 30, § 42 ("A corporation, being impersonal, cannot commit felonies,
because it cannot entertain felonious intent, nor can it commit crimes involving the element of
natural malice .... ); COOLEY, supra note 30, § 162 ("A municipality is not indictable for a
felony, since it is incapable of felonious intent, and can neither be hanged nor imprisoned."); 2
DILLON, supra note 30, § 746; JAMEs E. GRiOsaY, THE CRIMINAL LAW § 141 (1922) ("[A]rtificial
persons, not possessing the spiritual, mental or physical attributes of the natural persons, cannot
form the necessary evil or wicked intent to commit these crimes."); 17 McQuILIN, supra note 15,
at § 49.88; 64 CJ.S. Municipal Corporations § 2215 (1950); see also supra note 38.
When corporate or governmental officials engaged in conduct that did involve mens rea, such
as bribery, they could be prosecuted individually. See, e.g., Walsh v. People, 65 Ill. 58, 62 (1872);
2 DILLON, supra note 30, § 747 n.3; 2 WHARTON, supra note 30; § 1572b (noting that "[p]ublic
officers, including justices of the peace, are indictable for corruption if they accept or offer to
accept, under color of office, any money or other benefit calculated in any way to influence their
official course").
42. E.g., Ashley Borough, 37 Pa. Super. at 259 (affirming conviction of town indicted for
dumping sewage into public creek and thereby maintaining public nuisance).
43. See, e.g., State v. Canterbury, 28 N.H. 195, 227 (1854) (stating that criminal liability for
neglect rests substantially on statute, although it resembles the common-law offense); see also
COOLEY, supra note 30, § 162 (asserting that "indictments against municipal corporations have
been confined to statutory offenses"); 2 DILLON, supra note 30, § 746 (maintaining that munici-
palities are indictable for offenses "plainly enjoined by the legislature").
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duties included the obligation to build or repair a bridge 4 or perform some
other public function.45 Failure to carry out these duties was usually re-
ferred to as "nonfeasance.
4 6
The susceptibility of municipalities to criminal prosecution for creat-
ing or failing to abate a public nuisance reflected, in part, a more general
rule regarding the division of law and equity that prevailed in most jurisdic-
tions during much of the nineteenth century. This rule provided that
although private nuisances could be remedied either by a private damages
suit at law or a suit for injunctive relief in equity, public nuisances could be
addressed only by a state-initiated indictment or information in a court of
law.47
The lines between "criminal" and "civil," however, were not always
entirely clear. There was, for example, confusion about whether an infor-
mation brought in response to a public nuisance was, strictly speaking, a
criminal proceeding and, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the courts of
44. See, e.g., Canterbury, 28 N.H. at 227-28; State v. Inhabitants of Hudson, 30 N.J.L. 137,
142 (1862).
45. In Commonwealth v. Inhabitants of Dedham, 16 Mass. 141 (1819), for example, a town
was convicted of violating a Massachusetts statute that required every community containing 200
families or households to provide its public grammar schools with a schoolmaster of "good
morals, well instructed in the Latin, Greek and English languages." Id at 144. In upholding the
conviction, the Massachusetts Supreme Court noted that the "schools required by the statute
[were] to be maintained for the benefit of the whole town." Id. at 146.
46. Some early cases held that, although corporations could be indicted for nonfeasance, they
could not be indicted for misfeasance. See, e.g., State v. Great Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 20 Me.
41, 44 (1841). However, courts subsequently overruled most of these cases. See, e.g., State v.
City of Portland, 74 Me. 268, 273 (1883) (overruling Great Works). By the turn of the century,
the distinction had been "almost universally repudiated." LAZE.L, supra note 30, § 111; see also
BRICKEY, supra note 15, § 2:08 (describing development and decline of distinction between mis-
feasance and nonfeasance); GRIGSBY, supra note 41, § 142; JOHN W. MAY, THE LAW OF CRIMES
§ 38 (3d ed. 1905) (explaining that because both misfeasance and nonfeasance exist "irrespective
of criminal intent," there was no reason to limit the criminal liability of corporations in this
manner).
47. JOHN ADAMS, THE DocrINE OF EQurrY: A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW AS ADMINIs-
TERED BY THE COURT OF CHANCERY 427 (1873) ('The remedy at law for nuisance is by indict-
ment in respect of public nuisances, and by action in respect of private nuisances or of the private
injuries resulting from public ones."); MELvu.LE M. BIGELOW, ELEMENTS OF EQurrY FOR THE USE
OF STUDENTS 300 (1879) ("In cases of public nuisance, or nuisance to the injury of the general
public alike, an indictment may be maintained to abate them and to prosecute the offender .... )
(footnote omitted); GEORGE T. BIsPHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY: A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM
OF JuSTIcE ADMINISTERED IN COURTS OF CHANCERY 395 (1874) ("The remedy for public nuisance
is by information by the attorney general. But if the individual has also sustained special damage
over and above the public injury, he may also proceed by bill."); H.G. WOOD, A PRACTICAL
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NUISANCES § 863 (3d ed. 1893) ("In the case of public nuisances,....
the remedy is by indictment in respect of the public injury, and by action in respect of any particu-
lar or special damage sustained by individuals.') (footnotes omitted).
The particular significance of this rule in the context of municipal defendants is considered
further infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
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equity.48 Sophisticated commentators like Joel Bishop, author of a leading
nineteenth-century criminal law treatise, acknowledged doubts about the
extent to which "crimes" involving acts such as creating a nuisance could
be distinguished from torts.49
Nevertheless, the weight of the historical evidence suggests that state-
brought prosecutions against local municipalities were viewed as criminal
proceedings. Such prosecutions were initiated either by information"0 or
indictment."1 A municipality named as a criminal defendant enjoyed proce-
dural rights similar to those enjoyed by natural persons.5" Upon conviction,
the municipality was usually subject to a criminal fine, ranging from ten
dollars in 1844 for a failure to repair a city street5 3 to one thousand dollars
in 1856 for a failure to repair a bridge.54 The prosecution of municipalities
48. Compare Attorney Gen. v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 371, 391 (N.Y. 1817) (Kent, Ch.)
(holding that the chancery court has no jurisdiction over information filed against public nui-
sance); JOHN WsuARD, A TREATISE ON EQUrrY JURISPRUDENCE 390 (2d ed. 1880) ("In many of
the cases which are indictable, as common nuisances, courts of equity have no cognizance. The
remedy at the suit of the people by a public prosecution, will, in general, accomplish the object of
suppressing the injury, and render unnecessary the prosecution by individuals.") with 3 JOHN N.
POMEROY, A TRATISE ON EQUrrY JURISPRUDENCE § 1349 (1887) ("A court of equity has jurisdic-
tion to restrain existing or threatened public nuisances by injunction, at the suit of... the state, or
the people, or municipality, or some proper officer representing the commonwealth .... ") and 2
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE § 923 (12th ed. 1877) ("In cases of
public nuisances, properly so called, an indictment lies to abate them, and to punish the offenders.
But an information also lies in equity to redress the grievances by way of injunction.").
49. 1 BIsHoP, supra note 30, §§ 1074-77.
50. E.g., People v. City of Chicago, 100 N.E. 194, 195 (IlL. 1912); Commonwealth v. Ephrata
Borough's Town Council, 2 Pa. D. 349, 349 (1893).
51. E.g., Commonwealth v. City of Boston, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 442, 443 (1835); State v.
Canterbury, 28 N.H. 195, 195-96 (1854).
52. The issue of the municipality's procedural rights is rarely discussed in the cases. What
little discussion there is indicates that, when named as a criminal defendant, municipal corpora-
tions enjoyed rights that were similar to those enjoyed by natural persons. See City of Ludlow v.
Commonwealth, 56 S.W.2d 958, 959 (Ky. 1933) (reversing conviction of city where fine violated
state constitutional provision prohibiting excessive fines); State v. Canterbury, 28 N.H. 195, 228
(1854) (noting, with respect to defendant Towns of Canterbury and Boscawen, that under the New
Hampshire Constitution, "no citizen shall be held to answer for any crime or offence, until the
same is fully and plainly, substantially and formally described to him"); see also 64 C.J.S. Munici-
pal Corporations § 2216 (1950) ("General rules as to the trial and evidence in criminal proceed-
ings have been applied in criminal prosecutions against a municipal corporation.") (footnotes
omitted).
53. State v. Barksdale, 24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) 154, 154 (1844).
54. See State v. City of Bangor, 41 Me. 533, 534 (1856); see also People v. City of Chicago,
100 N.E. 194, 195 (Ill. 1912) (fining the city $25 for violation of law prohibiting city from em-
ploying women more than 10 hours per day); State v. Canterbury, 28 N.H. 195, 229 (1854) (im-
posing fine of unspecified amount for neglect to build or repair highways); Board of Chosen
Freeholders v. State, 42 N.J.L. 263, 264 (1880) (upholding a $10 fine and ordering the city to
improve a bridge or pay for expenses).
A corporation could also have its charter abrogated-a sort of corporate "capital punish-
ment," see MAY, supra note 46, § 38-although there do not appear to be any instances in which
courts ordered such a sanction against a municipality.
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was, moreover, addressed in the criminal law treatises." Most importantly,
these prosecutions were not, according to Bishop, intended to be compensa-
tory. 6 Rather, they were intended to further aims that were, and are, con-
sidered particularly appropriate for the criminal law: to "punish,"57 to
"correct public wrongs,"5" and to "prevent their repetition."59
B. Criminal Liability, the "Single Plaintiff' Principle, and the
Development of Municipal Immunity from Tort
As noted above,60 the general rule in the nineteenth century was that a
defendant responsible for causing a public nuisance was immune from pri-
vate tort suit but liable to state-initiated prosecution. There was an econom-
ically sound justification for this tradeoff: If a defendant that created a
nuisance affecting everyone in the community were subject to private tort
suits, it was likely to be "overwhelm[ed] . . . with litigation."6 On the
other hand, if no one were allowed to sue, the result would be underdeter-
rence. By allowing the state alone to institute an action, the courts were
able to achieve a practical, economically sound solution to this dilemma.
62
55. See supra note 30.
56. 1 BISHOP, supra note 30, § 249.
57. See City of Ludlow v. Commonwealth, 56 S.W.2d 958, 959 (Ky. 1933) (holding that
criminal fine against a town was intended to "punish and deter"); Town of Paintsville v. Common-
wealth, 55 S.W. 915, 915-16 (Ky. 1900) (standing for the proposition that town may be indicted
and punished for willful refusal to repair bridge).
58. See I BISHOP, supra note 30, § 247.
59. Id. On the other hand, the cases fail to indicate whether non-mens rea crimes were ac-
companied by the stigma that usually accompanies criminal proceedings.
60. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
61. See 1 BIsHoP, supra note 30, § 235. In modem terminology, the defendant would be
"overdeterred."
62. As Bishop explained:
[I]f the injury is common to the whole community, affecting no one person specially,
the law would be unreasonable to allow each to bring his separate suit, where all could
alike complain, and overwhelm the transgressor with litigation. Therefore the rule of
the law is, that, under such circumstances, no one can have his private action.
•. But if there were no public remedy, the wrong would go unredressed. When,
therefore, a thing is done to the injury of the whole community, and sufficient in magni-
tude for the tribunals to notice, it is cognizable criminally.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
This "single plaintiff' principle was the converse of what modem commentators generally
refer to as "enterprise liability," a principle that might, for the sake of symmetry, be called the
"single defendant" principle.
Logically, of course, there was no need for the state to bring a criminal prosecution in order
to achieve the intended effect. The same goal could have been achieved by vesting in the state the
exclusive right to bring a civil suit. Indeed, in some states, such as Kansas, state-initiated, civil
quo warranto suits seem to have served a similar purpose. See, e.g., State ex rel. Pleasant v. City
of Ottawa, 84 Kan. 100, 100 (1911) (bringing civil action to oust City of Ottawa from exercising
power to require engineers and firemen at city water and light plant to work more than eight hours
per day in contravention of state statute); State ex rel. Vance v. City of Topeka, 31 Kan. 452, 453
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This "single plaintiff' principle had a notable influence on the devel-
oping law of municipal tort immunity. The first American case to establish
such immunity was Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester.63 The Mower
court's principal justification for granting immunity (i.e., the authority of
what was probably an inapposite English case) 64 has been severely criti-
cized.65 But such criticism has overlooked another of Mower's justifica-
tions for holding the defendant county immune-namely, that such
immunity was in some sense conditioned on the county's susceptibility to
criminal indictment.6
Numerous cases involving municipal tort immunity-many of which
went beyond the public nuisance context-subsequently cited Mower.67
Only a few of those cases actually mentioned what has been referred to here
(1884) (county attorney bringing quo warranto suit in name of state to oust City of Topeka from
licensing persons to sell intoxicating liquors and taxing them for doing so); see also 17 MCQuIL.
LIN, supra note 15, § 50 (summarizing quo warranto law); 4 C. DALLAS STONE ET AL., LOCAL
GovERNmENT LAW §§ 29.01-.06 (summarizing law concerning non-criminal, state-brought "pub-
lic actions" against municipalities).
An alternative solution to the problem of inefficient multiple lawsuits involving related
claims was to allow a "bill of peace," a precursor to the modem class action. See ZACHARIAII
CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQuIrY 200-01 (1950) (describing procedural device for aggre-
gation of claims used in English courts of equity in 17th century).
63. 9 Mass. 247, 247-50 (1812) (holding defendant county immune from tort suit brought by
owner of public stagecoach whose horse was injured while crossing bridge allegedly kept in poor
repair).
64. In ruling that the defendant county was immune from suit in tort, the court relied on a
distinction between "quasi-corporations" (i.e., municipal entities "created by the legislature for
purposes of public policy") and corporations "created for their own benefit." Id. at 249. Follow-
ing the authority of an earlier English case, Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 673, 100 Eng.
Rep. 359, 362 (K.B. 1788), the court held that while "corporations created for their own benefit"
could, under the common law, be sued "on the same ground.., as individuals," quasi-corpora-
tions could not be sued without a legislative enactment. Id. Since it found that the county was a
quasi-corporation and the legislature had made no provision for liability, the Mower court held
that the county was immune from suit in tort. Id.
65. It appears that Mower was wrong to rely on Russell, because the defendant in Mower in
fact was incorporated. See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFF-
CIAL WRONGS 206, 254 (1983); James D. Barnett, Foundations of the Distinction Between Public
and Private Functions in Respect to the Common Law Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations,
16 OR. L. REv. 250, 264 (1936); Edwin M. Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE
L.J. 1, 41-42 (1924); John St. Francis Repko, American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of
Municipal Tort Liability, 9 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBs. 214, 215 (1942).
66. See Mower, 9 Mass. at 249 (stating that quasi corporations "are subject, by the common
law, to an indictment for the neglect of duties enjoined on them; but are not liable to an action for
such neglect, unless the action be given by some statute") (emphasis added).
Although several commentators have mentioned the fact that the defendant county was sub-
ject to indictment, none seems to have thought it very significant. See HARTOG, supra note 29, at
190; SCHUCK, supra note 65, at 254.
67. See, e.g., Long v. City of Weirton, 214 S.E.2d 832, 853 (W.V. 1975) (showing influence
of Mower); Note, Municipal Tort Immunity in Virginia, 68 VA. L. REV. 639, 640-41 (1982)
(same).
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as the single plaintiff principle.6" Nevertheless, given the role it played in
the Mower case itself, the susceptibility of municipalities to criminal indict-
ment should be recognized as having had a seminal, if indirect, influence on
the development of municipal tort immunity.
C. Immunity for Actions Performed in a "Governmental" or
"Discretionary" Capacity
By the middle of the nineteenth century, courts had begun to distin-
guish not just between different types of municipalities,69 but also between
the different capacities in which municipalities performed. For a combina-
tion of political and doctrinal reasons that other commentators have dis-
cussed extensively,7" courts developed two sets of related distinctions: a
distinction between municipal functions that were "governmental" as op-
posed to "proprietary" and a distinction between municipal functions that
were "discretionary" rather than "ministerial."71
Both distinctions are now most familiar in the tort context. In some
American jurisdictions, cities are still liable in tort only to the extent that
they have exercised proprietary functions.7" The usual rationale for this
rule is that municipalities acting in their governmental capacity act as part
of the state government and, therefore, share in the state's sovereign
immunity. 7 3
An analogous rule existed in the context of the crininal law: Munici-
palities acting in a governmental capacity were immune from criminal pros-
ecution, but those acting in a proprietary capacity were not.74 In some
respects, this rule made even more sense in the criminal context than it did
in the tort context. Unlike the right to sue in tort, the right to bring a crimi-
nal prosecution has traditionally been viewed as an exclusively governmen-
tal prerogative.7 1 Therefore, unless a municipality acting in its
68. See, e.g., Morey v. Town of Newfane, 8 Barb. 645, 652 (N.Y. 1850) (quoting Mower on
this point).
69. See supra note 64; see also Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U.S. 540, 552 (1875)
(noting distinction between liability of municipal and quasi-corporations).
70. See, e.g., HARTOG, supra note 29, at 1-60; Frug, supra note 2, at 1099; Carol F. Lee, The
Federal Courts and the Status of Municipalities: A Conceptual Challenge, 62 B.U. L. REv. 1, 8-
11 (1980).
71. See supra note 70.
72. 5 FOWLER V. HARPER Er AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 29:6, at 620-39 (2d ed. 1986); 2
STUART M. SPEISER Er AL., THE AMERIcAN LAW OF TORTS § 6:9, at 48-57 (1985).
73. 5 HARPEa, supra note 72, § 29:6, at 624.
74. See, e.g., City of Georgetown v. Commonwealth, 73 S.W. 1011, 1014 (Ky. 1903) (re-
versing conviction of municipality for failure to prosecute nuisance occurring on private property
because failure to act was done in governmental capacity).
75. See Stuart P. Green, Note, Private Challenges to Prosecutorial Inaction: A Model De-
claratory Judgment Statute, 97 YALE L.J. 488, 494-95 & n.39 (1988).
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governmental capacity (i.e., acting "as the state") was immune from prose-
cution, the state would face the uncomfortable possibility of having to pros-
ecute itself.
76
This ban on "self-prosecution"-and the difficulty of applying it in a
consistent manner-is well illustrated by a comparison of two cases with
very similar facts, but directly opposed holdings. In the first, People v. City
of Chicago,77 the defendant was convicted of violating Illinois' Woman's
Ten-Hour Law, which prohibited any "mechanical or mercantile establish-
ment" from employing any "female" for more than ten hours during any
one day. 78 Two women-Julia Klein, a cook, and Edna Kuhnan, a nurse-
had each worked more than ten hours on a certain day at a city-managed
hospital. 79 The city contended that it could not be guilty of a criminal of-
fense because, as a political subdivision of the state, a criminal prosecution
against the municipality would indirectly constitute an action by the state
against itself.8 0 The Illinois Supreme Court rejected this argument, reason-
ing that a municipality may act in two different capacities-one govern-
mental, the other private. In the former capacity, the municipality is the
"agent of the state, and assists in the government of the territory."8" In the
latter capacity, it
represents those proprietary interests that appertain to it in com-
mon with other corporations. It makes contracts, employs men,
owns property, and transacts business in the same way as individ-
uals and private corporations. In this capacity it may sue and be
sued, and is governed by the same laws and rules and subject to
the same regulations and limitations that natural persons are, ex-
cept so far as it may be exempt by express enactment.
8 2
The court found no problem of self-prosecution, since the municipality was
acting in its "private, proprietary" capacity. 3
76. A version of this argument also appears in the Australian High Court case of Cain v.
Doyle, 72 C.L.R. 409 (1946). Under an Australian statute, employers were criminally liable for
unreasonably terminating employees who had completed a certain period of war service. Id. at
411. The defendant, manager of a Commonwealth munitions factory, was prosecuted for unlaw-
fully terminating members of a returned soldiers' organization. Id. at 410. Under the statute, the
defendant's conviction depended on a finding that he was an accessory to an offense committed
by the employees' former employer, the Crown. Id. at 411-12. Although a majority of the High
Court decided to affirm the order of the lower court dismissing the information, the reasoning of
the judges varied. Chief Justice Latham's principal concern was with preventing a construction of
the statute that would require the Crown, as a criminal defendant, to prosecute, or pay a fine to,
itself. Id. at 418 (Latham, C.J.).
77. 100 N.E. 194 (Ill. 1912).
78. Id. at 196.
79. Id. at 195.
80. Id. at 196.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 197.
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In the second case, State v. Metropolitan Park District of Tacoma, 4
the Washington Supreme Court reversed the conviction of the Tacoma Met-
ropolitan Park District, a special municipal corporation, for violating a stat-
ute that forbade the employment of females for more than eight hours per
day in any "mechanical or mercantile establishment."' 5 The court distin-
guished City of Chicago on the dubious ground that, unlike the maintenance
of a hospital, the "regulation and maintenance of public parks" was not a
"private or proprietary act of a municipal corporation, but rests purely
within the governmental function of such corporations."86
There was, moreover, another wrinkle in this doctrine. Even when a
city was acting in its proprietary capacity, it was still immune from criminal
prosecution if it was performing a "discretionary" or "legislative," as op-
posed to "ministerial," function.87 This distinction, however, like the gov-
ernmental/proprietary distinction itself, was notoriously difficult to apply.
In Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Bergen v. State,88 for
example, a New Jersey court discussed whether a city's refusal to build or
repair a bridge fell within the proper limits of its discretion: "[W]here the
public would be deprived of the beneficial use of the highway without the
bridge, a refusal to provide it would constitute a breach of official duty."
89
In contrast, "where a road not much used crosses a stream of water which
can be safely forded, the [town] may in [its] discretion decline to interfere,
without subjecting [itself] to restraint from any other tribunal."9 As these
84. 171 P. 254 (Wash. 1918).
85. Id. at 254.
86. Id. at 255.
87. See State v. Town of Burlington, 36 Vt. 521, 524 (1864) (stating that the duty to remove
a nuisance was not "absolute" but "dependent upon the exercise of [the selectmen's] judgment
and discretion"); Town of Saukville v. State, 33 N.W. 88, 89 (Wis. 1887) (upholding the convic-
tion of Town for failing to repair a common bridge on a public highway; stating, in dicta, that had
there been evidence that the "electors of the town had voted that it was not necessary to repair the
bridge in question, that the interests and convenience of the public did not demand it, or that the
town had no money which could be appropriated for that purpose, it would be manifestly unjust to
impose a fine upon the town for the alleged omission of duty"); see also People v. Adsit, 2 Hill
619, 619 (N.Y. 1842) (dismissing indictment that failed to allege that there were sufficient funds
available to pay for repair of bridge).
The discretionary/ministeria function distinction relied on in these cases was presumably
based on the same concern for separation of powers that justified reliance on this distinction in the
tort context. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 648 (1980) ("For a court or jury,
in the guise of a tort suit, to review the reasonableness of the city's judgment on [issues of public
policy] would be an infringement upon the powers properly vested in a coordinate and coequal
branch of government."); cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803) (using
discretionary/ministerial distinction to define boundaries of judicial power to compel executive
action).
88. 42 N.J.L. 263, 272-73 (1880).
89. Id. at 273-74.
90. Id. at 274.
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passages suggest, distinguishing between what was discretionary and what
was ministerial was no easy task.
D. Reasons for the State Prosecution of Municipalities in the
Nineteenth Century and for Its Decline
As noted earlier,91 cases involving the state criminal prosecution of
local governments occurred too infrequently and were too widely dispersed
to allow for any definitive conclusions about how they fit into the develop-
ment of local government law during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Nevertheless, one can offer several observations about why such
prosecutions occurred, and why they ultimately disappeared.
It is clear that the state-initiated criminal prosecution of local govern-
ments was never a preferred remedy. The paucity of cases suggests that
states utilized such prosecutions only when less intrusive methods were
either unavailable or ineffective. Nevertheless, such cases remained a fix-
ture. Even as states began exercising increasingly direct political control
over local governments, occasions still arose when it was impossible for a
state government simply to order, or "bribe," a municipality to build a road,
repair a bridge, abate a nuisance, or otherwise comply with state policy.
Many local municipalities continued to maintain an independent revenue
base and the autonomy to run their own day-to-day affairs.92 In such cir-
cumstances, it became necessary for the state or, more accurately, a prose-
cutor acting on behalf of the state to seek relief in court.93 And, because of
various and frequently formalistic doctrines of tort immunity, the division
of law and equity, and the appropriate remedies for public and private
harms (each of which has been described above), the means by which the
state acted was sometimes a criminal prosecution.
Nevertheless, the use of such prosecutions eventually abated. In 1933,
the Commonwealth of Kentucky brought an unsuccessful criminal prosecu-
tion against the City of Ludlow.94 In 1975, the Commonwealth of Penn-
91. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
92. HARTOG, supra note 29, at 188.
93. In the influential theories advanced by John Dillon, the leading 19th-century commenta-
tor on the law of municipalities, the abuses of local governments were to be restrained through
enhanced state control. See 2 DILLON, supra note 30, § 745. As Professor Gerald Frug has noted,
Dillon's conception of such state control included a "major role for the courts." See Frug, supra
note 2, at 1111-12.
94. City of Ludlow v. Commonwealth, 56 S.W.2d 958 (Ky. 1933). The city built an alleg-
edly defective sewer that, when it rained, caused backups in the basements of several residences,
"producing an odor so noisome, offensive, and sickening that the occupants of the houses could
not eat or sleep." Id. at 958. The state prosecuted and the city was convicted of maintaining a
common nuisance and fined $1500. Id. It appealed. The court of appeals cited three earlier
Kentucky cases in which cities had been held criminally liable for maintaining a public nuisance.
Id. at 959 (citing City of Paris v. Commonwealth, 93 S.W. 907 (Ky. 1906); City of Newport v.
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sylvania was more successful in its prosecution of the Fleetwood Borough
Authority. 95 These appear to be the last reported cases in which a state
brought a criminal prosecution against a government or governmental
agency, except for one curious 1984 case in which the State of California,
acting through the City Attorney of Los Angeles, brought criminal charges
against the Veterans Administration, a federal government agency. 96
The reasons for the demise of such prosecutions are varied and elusive.
Certainly, nothing in the City of Ludlow or Fleetwood Borough cases them-
selves foreclosed the possibility of their being brought. To be sure, a few
states adopted a Model Penal Code provision that might have been intended
to have such an effect. 97 Much more significant, however, has been the
increasingly clear identification of the municipal corporation as a creature
of state government-an identification that made the problem of "self-pros-
ecution" more prominent and the state criminal prosecution of such entities
increasingly awkward. In addition, the public nuisances and breached pub-
lic duties once dealt with by state-initiated criminal prosecutions increas-
ingly were addressed through the expanded use of federal, state, and
privately-initiated civil suits.9" This development was facilitated by the tre-
Commonwealth, 55 S.W. 914 (Ky. 1900); Commonwealth v. City of Somerset, 14 Ky. L. Rptr.
238 (1892)). Nevertheless, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the grounds that the
$1500 fine imposed on the City violated Kentucky's constitutional prohibition of excessive fines.
Id. at 968-69.
95. Commonwealth v. Fleetwood Borough Auth., 346 A.2d 867, 868-69 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1975) (upholding conviction and $300 fine of Borough authority for violations of sewage permit
issued by Sanitary Water Board.)
96. See People v. Walters, 751 F.2d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming dismissal of criminal
prosecution brought by City of Los Angeles against Veterans Administration in connection with
the alleged disposal of hazardous medical wastes, on the grounds that there was no clear and
unambiguous evidence that the federal government had waived its sovereign immunity to criminal
sanctions).
97. As Part II of this Article explains, determining whether a municipality is subject to a
particular criminal statute is, in the first instance, a question of whether the defendant is a "per-
son" or "corporation" within the meaning of the statute. Section 2.07(4)(a) of the Model Penal
Code excludes from the definition of "corporations" that may be convicted of a criminal offense
entities "organized as or by a governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program."
The Commentary to § 2.07(4)(a) states that "[I]iability in such cases would seem entirely point-
less." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, commentary at 3455 (1985). At least five states have adopted
a version of § 2.07(4)(a). HAW. REv. STAT. § 702-229(1) (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-7(b)(1)
(West 1982); N.D. CENrr. CODE § 12.1-0304(I)(b) (Supp. 1993); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2901.23(D) (Anderson 1993); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 307(F) (1983). The model provision is at
best ambiguous, however, since it is unclear whether it is intended to immunize entities organized
as governmental agencies only when they are executing governmental programs or whether it is
also intended to immunize such agencies when they are acting in a proprietary capacity.
98. For examples of federal- and state-brought civil suits involving alleged "public nui-
sances," see Michigan v. City of Allen Park, 501 F. Supp. 1007, 1011-12 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (suit
by state to compel city to use a specific type of water pollution control), aff'd mem., 667 F.2d
1028 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982); United States v. County Bd. of Arlington
County, 487 F. Supp. 137, 139 (E.D. Va. 1979) (suit to prevent construction of high-rise office
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mendous growth of the administrative state (which supplanted many of the
regulatory functions previously overseen by the common-law courts9 9 ), as
well as by the almost universal merger of law and equity"° (which relieved
plaintiffs of their former inability to seek injunctive relief from public
nuisances).
II. FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF
LocAL GOVERNMENTS
The apparent obsolescence of state criminal prosecution of local gov-
ernments need not preclude the possibility of federally initiated prosecu-
tions of such entities. The types of crimes that municipalities are now most
likely to commit-violations of the environmental, civil rights, and antitrust
laws, to name three of the most prominent-have in large part been federal-
ized. Should there remain a need for the criminal prosecution of local gov-
ermments,10 ' it is therefore likely to be at the federal level. Accordingly, the
focus of this Article now shifts from the history of criminal prosecution of
municipalities under state law to a focus on the legal apparatus and policies
surrounding such prosecutions under federal law. In the course of this dis-
cussion, three themes first raised in the nineteenth century state cases re-
main central: whether municipalities can form mens rea, whether there are
economic or practical justifications for limiting the scope of liability to a
single plaintiff or defendant rather than multiple plaintiffs or defendants,
and whether municipalities should enjoy immunity from prosecution when
acting in a "governmental" or "discretionary" capacity.
This Part also addresses two basic issues concerning the framework for
the criminal prosecution of local governments under federal law. First, are
there federal criminal statutes 0 2 involving environmental law, antitrust, and
civil rights that can reasonably be construed to apply to municipalities?
buildings and hotel because such construction would increase traffic and congestion and create
visual intrusion on national parks and monuments); People v. City of Los Angeles, 325 P.2d 639,
641 (Cal. App. 1958) (action to enforce injunction restraining Los Angeles from discharging sew-
age into Santa Monica Bay); People v. City of Reedley, 226 P. 408, 408 (Cal. App. 1924) (nui-
sance suit by state concerning passage of sewage effluent between two counties); State ex rel.
Lamm v. City of Sedalia, 241 S.W. 656, 656 (Mo. App. 1922) (nuisance suit by state concerning
city's disposal of dead animals).
99. See CASS R. SuNsTEIN, AFrER THE RIOHTs REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVINO THE REGULA-
TORY STATE 17, 20-21 (1990).
100. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.6, at 18 (3d
ed. 1985).
101. Part I argues that there is such a need. See infra notes 215-73 and accompanying text.
102. It has long been settled that federal criminal prosecutions must be brought under federal
statutory, as opposed to common, law. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 32, 33 (1812); see also Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 213 (1985) (stating that
federal crimes are created solely by statute). Thus, the determination whether a particular defend-
ant is subject to federal criminal law is, in the first instance, an exercise in statutory construction.
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Second, even assuming that one can construe various federal criminal stat-
utes in this manner, would such entities nevertheless be immune from pros-
ecution, either through some generalizable judicial doctrine of immunity or
through some more specific statutory grant of immunity?
A. Statutory Construction
1. The Municipality as a "Person"
Federal criminal statutes typically provide that every "person," or
"whoever," commits some crime shall be subject to a specified penalty.10 3
To determine whether a given criminal statute applies to municipalities,
then, one must thus decide whether the terms "person" and "whoever" refer
to such entities." 4
Federal environmental law provides the most straightforward example.
Of ten major environmental statutes imposing both criminal and civil sanc-
tions, 05 at least eight" 6 include in the definition of "person" municipali-
ties; government corporations; or political subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of a state.'0 7
103. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988) (stating that "whoever" corruptly gives or promises any-
thing of value to public official with intent to influence official act shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both); 18 U.S.C. § 842(a)(1) (1988) (mak-
ing it unlawful for any "person" to import, manufacture, or deal in explosives without license); see
also infra notes 133, 135.
104. Another possibility is that a criminal statute might apply to "corporations," in which case
one would need to determine whether the statute applies to both business corporations and munici-
pal corporations.
105. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 1361(b) (1988);
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b) (Supp. IV 1992); Endangered Species Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1540(b) (1988); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992);
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992);
Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(b) (1988); Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1988); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (Supp. III 1991);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9603(b), (c) (1988); Emergency Planning Community Right to Know Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 11045(b)(4) (1988). See generally Robert W. Adler & Charles Lord, Environmental Crimes:
Raising the Stakes, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 781 passim (1991) (discussing the criminal aspects of
environmental statutes).
106. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (1988); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(5) (1988); Marine, Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1402(e) (1988);
Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f(12) (1988); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (1988);
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (1988); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1988); Emergency
Planning Community Right to Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11049(7) (1988).
107. Many of these statutes also define "person" to include states, "interstate bodies," federal
agencies, and the federal government itself. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (1988) (definition of
"person" includes states); 42 U.S.C. § 300f(12) (1988) ("person" includes states and federal agen-
cies); 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (1988) ("person" includes states and interstate bodies); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7602(e) (1988) ("person" includes states and departments or instrumentalities of the United
States); 42 U.S.C. 9601(21) (1988) ("person" includes United States government); 42 U.S.C.
§ 11049(7) (1988) ("person" includes states and interstate bodies).
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In light of its plain meaning, the definition of "person" in these envi-
ronmental statutes almost certainly applies to municipal defendants-
whether in the civil context 108 or in the criminal context, as a 1978 Clean
Water Act prosecution of the Little Rock Sewer Committee suggests.10 9
Indeed, starting in the late 1970s, Congress amended the definition of "per-
son" in many of these environmental statutes precisely because it wanted to
ensure that the environmental laws would apply to local governmental
defendants. 110
The possibility that the criminal provisions of these and other statutes could be applied to the
federal government and to the states raises interesting issues that are mostly beyond the scope of
this Article. For example, given the serious environmental problems created by the United States
military, see sources supra note 17, one can imagine the Department of Justice bringing a criminal
case against another executive branch agency, such as the Department of the Army or one of its
entities. Although such a prosecution might arguably be justified as a matter of policy, it would
raise the objection that the government was bringing criminal charges against itself. For a discus-
sion of the problems inherent in "self-prosecution," see supra text accompanying notes 76-83.
See also supra note 96 (discussing case in which a federal agency was prosecuted by a state
prosecutor).
The possibility of a federal criminal prosecution of a state agency was, for a time, raised by
the recent case of In re Antitrust Grand Jury Investigation (Hospital Services), Misc. No. 92-M-58
W (D. Utah). The case involved a grand jury investigation into charges that the University of
Utah and other public and private defendants had violated the antitrust laws. The University
argued that under the state actor doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943), it
should be immune from both criminal and civil antitrust charges. In October 1993, the Depart-
ment of Justice announced that it had dropped its criminal investigation of the University and
various other defendants, and had decided to pursue the civil antitrust claims alone. See Cherrill
Crosby, Two Utah Hospitals Off the Hook in Criminal Probe, SALT LAKE TRIa., Oct. 22, 1993, at
Al. The author of this Article served as counsel to the University in that case.
Such a prosecution would raise federalism concerns that might well be more significant than
the federalism concerns raised by the federal criminal prosecution of municipalities. See infra
notes 182-84 and accompanying text; cf. Briffault, supra note 29, at 93 n.385:
The states enjoy textual protection under the Constitution and function as fundamental
components of the structure of the national government. American federalism has con-
sistently been framed in the context of nation-state and state-state relations. Local gov-
ernments lack the political status and historic role of the states, and have no claim to the
states' special relationship with the national government. In the absence of a specific
congressional grant of immunity, the most local governments can aspire to is autonomy,
not sovereignty.
108. See United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1634 (1992) (holding in civil
case that the term "person" in CWA and RCRA applies to states, subdivisions of states, munici-
palities, and interstate bodies); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992)
(stating that the term "person" in CERCLA applies to municipal defendants); Westfarm Assoc. v.
International Fabricare Inst., Civ. No. HM-92-9, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15921, *11-* 12 (D. Md.
July 16, 1993) (applying term "facility" in remedial provisions of CERCLA to a municipal sewage
system).
109. United States v. Little Rock Sewer Comm., 460 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ark. 1978). The case is
discussed further infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Safe Drinking Water Amendments of 1977, H. Rep. No. 95-338, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 12 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3648, 3659 (expanding the definition of
"person" under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (1988)).
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A particularly apt example is the Endangered Species Act.1 1'
Prior to a 1988 amendment, the Act's definition of "person" included
no explicit reference to municipalities, referring only to "departments
and instrumentalities" of states and "instrumentalities of political
subdivisions" of states.112 In United States v. City of Rancho Palos
Verdes,"' this omission proved decisive. In affirming the district court's
dismissal of a criminal information brought against the City of Rancho Pa-
los Verdes," 4 the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant was not a "person"
as defined in the Act. As a political subdivision of the State of California,
the city could be neither an instrumentality of the state nor an instrumental-
ity of a political subdivision of the state." 5 Shortly after the Ninth Circuit
handed down this decision, Congress amended the Endangered Species
Act's definition of "person" to refer expressly to "municipalities.""' 6 In so
doing, Congress seems to have removed any doubt that the federal govern-
ment can criminally prosecute municipalities for violations of the Endan-
gered Species Act. Naturally, this decision could have implications in cases
involving other federal environmental statutes with parallel language.
When viewed in the context of federal law generally, however, the
environmental statutes seem somewhat anomalous. Under most federal
criminal statutes-including the criminal antitrust and civil rights stat-
utes-the definitions of "person" and "whoever" contain no explicit refer-
ence to municipalities or governmental corporations." 7 Here, the task of
statutory construction is more complex.
111. 16 U.S.C. § 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
112. Id. § 1532(13) (1982) (amended 1988).
113. 841 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1988).
114. Id. at 330-31.
115. Id. at 330. The court's reading of the statute seems correct, even if somewhat cramped; it
may reflect an unspoken concern over the danger of imposing criminal liability on a municipal
corporation.
116. Pub. L. No. 100-478, tit. I, § 1001(a)(12), 102 Stat. 2306, 2306 (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (1988)). Although the legislative history does not expressly mention the
City of Rancho Palos Verdes case, it could hardly have been a coincidence that, so soon after the
Ninth Circuit had issued its opinion, Congress amended the Act to remedy the precise defect that
the court had identified.
117. See infra notes 124, 133. One exception was the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,
ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (1942) (terminated 1947), which made it "unlawful" for "any person" to violate
maximum price regulations promulgated by the Federal Price Administrator. Id. § 4(a), 56 Stat. at
28. Included in the Act's definition of "person" were the "United States and any agency thereof,
or any other government, or any of its political subdivisions, or any agency of any of the forego-
ing." Id. § 302(h), 56 Stat. at 37. Courts repeatedly held that the Act applied to state and local
governments. Hulbert v. Twin Falls County, 327 U.S. 103, 104-05 (1946) ("person" includes
counties); Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 99-100 (1946) ("person" includes states aiid their subdivi-
sions); City of Dallas v. Bowles, 152 F.2d 464, 465 (Emerg. Ct. App. 1945) ("person" includes
cities). What makes the Emergency Price Control Act apparently unique, however, is that while
governmental entities were expressly included within the definition of "person," they were at the
same time also expressly exempted from the Act's criminal sanctions (although not from the Act's
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Traditional canons of construction provide that courts should construe
statutes narrowly when, among other things, they involve punitive sanc-
tions 118 or threaten sovereignty. 119 One must therefore be particularly cer-
tain before applying a criminal statute to a local government. Nevertheless,
there are persuasive reasons for construing the terms "person" and "who-
ever" in this manner.
This question has an interesting history with regard to the Sherman
Act,'20 which functions as both a civil and criminal antitrust statute. 12 1 In
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,'22 the defendant cities
were sued for civil damages.12 3 In seeking to escape such liability, the cit-
ies argued that, under the Act, the term "person" 24 could not refer to mu-
nicipalities, because it would be "anomalous" to subject such entities to
criminal liability."z In a plurality opinion, the United States Supreme
Court rejected this argument, holding that the term "person" does indeed
include municipalities.' 26 The Court cited three cases in which it had "re-
quire[d] compliance by municipalities with the substantive standards of
other federal laws which impose such sanctions upon 'persons.'" 2 7 At the
punitive damages provisions). See Title mEI, § 302(h), ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23, 37 (1942) (terminated
1947); see also Hulbert, 327 U.S. at 105 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that states are exempted
from the Act's criminal sanctions, but not from its punitive damages provisions).
118. See 3 NoRMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 59.01-.09 (5th ed.
1992).
119. Id. §§ 62.01-.04.
120. 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
Section 1 provides in part: "Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combina-
tion or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... ." 15
U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV 1992). Section 2 provides in part: "Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony ..... Id. § 2.
121. See PHILLIP AREEDA & Louis KAPLoW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 66 (4th ed. 1988) ("Sher-
man Act § 1 and § 2 and the relevant procedural provisions make no express distinction with
respect to the civil-criminal, the legal-equitable, or the public-private nature of the lawsuit that
brings an antitrust question to the courts.").
122. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
123. Id. at 392.
124. Section 8 of the Sherman Act provides that "the word 'person' or 'persons,' whenever
used in this act shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or author-
ized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any
State or the laws of any foreign country." 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
125. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 400.
126. Id. at 394-97. Chief Justice Burger, the fifth member of the majority, agreed that the
municipalities in this case were subject to liability, but only because they were acting in a "propri-
etary" rather than "governmental" capacity. Id. at 422 (Burger, C.J., concurring). For more on
this distinction, see supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
127. Id. at 400-02. The three cases were: California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577 (1944)
(holding that cities and states are subject to §§ 16 and 17 of the Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 815,
816 (1940), making unlawful certain practices of "persons"); Union Pacific R.R. v. United States,
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same time, the Court avoided a question it did not need to answer-namely,
whether a municipality could be criminally prosecuted under the Sherman
Act.12 Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that, purely as a
question of statutory construction-and putting aside for now the possibil-
ity that municipalities are immune from criminal antitrust prosecution by
virtue of the state actor doctrine of Parker v. Brown129 or the Local Govern-
ment Antitrust Act13 0-a court should hold that, following the reasoning of
Lafayette, municipalities can be criminally prosecuted under the Sherman
Act.
131
The question of statutory construction also has an interesting history
under the civil rights laws. The Supreme Court's decision in Monell v.
Department of Social Services132 made it clear that the term "person'" in 42
U.S.C. § 1983133 -which provides civil relief for deprivation of constitu-
tional rights-refers to municipalities and other local governmental
units.134 The criminal corollary to § 1983 is 18 U.S.C. § 242.135 Section
313 U.S. 450,463 (1941) (applying to city § 1 of Elkins Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1940), making it
unlawful for any "person" to "offer, grant, or give or to solicit, accept, or receive any rebate,
concession, or discrimination in respect to the transportation of any property in interstate or for-
eign commerce by any [covered] common carrier"); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 370 (1934)
(applying to state a statute that imposed federal tax liability on every "person" who "sells or offers
for sale" alcoholic beverages).
128. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 401-02 ("[Those cases do not necessarily require the conclusion
that remedies appropriate to redress violations by private corporations would be equally appropri-
ate for municipalities; nor need we decide any question of remedy in this case.').
129. 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943). As interpreted in City of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471
U.S. 34, 42-47 (1985), the Parker doctrine immunizes from all antitrust liability municipalities
acting pursuant to clearly articulated state policy, even when the anticompetitive effects of such a
policy have not been expressly acknowledged.
130. Even when not immune under the "clear articulation" standard of the Parker doctrine, see
supra note 129, a municipality might nevertheless be immune under the Local Government Act,
the subject of which is considered infra notes 206-14 and accompanying text.
131. It should be acknowledged, however, that doubts have been raised as to whether local
governments should, even in the civil context, be subject to per se antitrust liability. See Commu-
nity Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 65 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (ques-
tioning whether "'per se' rules of illegality apply to municipal defendants in the same manner as
they are applied to private defendants"); see also City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 435 U.S. 389, 417 n.48 (1978) ("It may be that certain activities which might appear anticom-
petitive when engaged in by private parties, take on a different complexion when adopted by a
local government."). Perhaps the best approach would be to apply per se liability to local govern-
ments only when they are participating in truly proprietary activity in direct competition with
private corporations. See Edward W. Barnett, Suggestions from Outside Counsel, in ANTrrRuST
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENr, supra note 18, at 43, 46. Whether criminal liability should be im-
posed, even in these circumstances, is, of course, a separate question.
132. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
133. "[Elvery person" who, under color of state law, deprives a citizen of federal rights "shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
134. 436 U.S. at 690.
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242 has frequently been used to prosecute local government officials.136
There appears to be only one instance, however, in which the federal gov-
ernment sought to use § 242 against a local governmental entity.
In United States v. City of Philadelphia,'37 the Department of Justice
brought suit against the City of Philadelphia, seeking to remedy widespread
and systematic civil rights violations. Although the Government sued under
§ 242, the remedies it sought (a declaratory judgment and an injunction)
were civil.' 38 The court rejected the notion that § 242 could be used in this
manner, but it did so on the theory that the Government was an improper
plaintiff to seek such relief.' Neither the parties nor the court considered
whether the city was a proper defendant under § 242.
While there is little, if any, case law to resolve this issue, two princi-
ples of statutory construction suggest that the term "whoever" in § 242
should be construed to refer to local governments. First, the terms "person"
and "whoever" are, for jurisdictional purposes, typically viewed as
equivalents. 4 ° Second, courts have interpreted §§ 1983 and 242 in pari
materia.14 1 Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude, at least as a preliminary
matter, that, just as § 1983 applies to municipalities, so should § 242.
2. The Problem of Inapplicable Criminal Sanctions
In determining whether a particular criminal statute applies to munici-
palities, one must consider the penalties that the statute imposes. Like pri-
135. "[W]hoever, under color of any law ... willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State...
to the deprivation of any rights ... secured or protected by the Constitution ... shall be fined not
more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988).
136. E.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 93 (1945); United States v. Langer, 958 F.2d
522, 522 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Currie, 609 F.2d 1193, 1193 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 928 (1980); United States v. Fleming, 526 F.2d 191, 192 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 423
U.S. 1082 (1976); United States v. Senak, 477 F.2d 304, 305 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856
(1973).
137. 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980).
138. Id. at 190. Although § 242 offered no such civil relief on its face, the Government ar-
gued (unsuccessfully) that such relief could be inferred. Id. at 190-92.
139. Id. at 197. In dismissing the suit, the court held that the federal government had no
standing under § 242 to seek injunctive relief. 644 F.2d at 194-99. Even assuming that the court
was correct in holding that the federal government had no statutory authority to seek broadsweep-
ing injunctive relief against the city, its use of standing analysis was flawed. The federal govern-
ment always has standing to prosecute under § 242, or any other criminal statute. The real
question was whether § 242, a criminal statute, afforded the civil remedy that the Government
sought to impose.
140. See Dictionary Act, I U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (stating that "unless the context indicates other-
wise ... the terms 'person' and 'whoever' shall include corporations, companies, associations,
firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals").
141. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184-85 (1961) (defining "under color of law"
requirement of § 1983 in the same manner as § 242), overruled on other grounds by Monell v.
New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663, 695-96 (1978).
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vate corporations, 142 towns and cities are not susceptible to prosecution
for crimes punishable only by imprisonment or death.143 As noted
above,144 this was one of the principal reasons nineteenth-century courts
and commentators cited for the proposition that corporations could not
commit a felony.
The problem of the inapplicable criminal sanction does not arise in the
context of the environmental 4 5 and antitrust 46 laws; in both cases, the
court is free to choose between a fine and imprisonment. With the civil
rights laws, however, the problem of the inapplicable sanction does arise,
albeit in limited form.
When a defendant is convicted of assault, § 242 provides for fines of
not more than $1,000, imprisonment of not more than one year, or both.'4 7
In providing such a choice, § 242 is analogous to the Sherman Act and
various environmental statutes148 and would apply unproblematically to
municipal corporations. However, § 242 also includes an additional fea-
ture. When a civil rights violation results in the victim's death, the statute
provides that the defendant "shall be subject to imprisonment for any term
of years or for life"'149-an enhancement that clearly would not apply to
municipalities. This fact should not preclude the possibility of prosecuting
a municipality under § 242 whenever the victim is killed, however. When a
§ 242 prosecution is brought against a municipal corporation, the penalty
enhancement provision simply should not apply.'
50
142. Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United States, 213 F. 926, 933 (8th Cir. 1914), aff'd, 236 U.S.
531, 549 (1915); Herbert R. Chermside, Annotation, Corporation's Liability to Criminal Prosecu-
tion as Affected by Punishment or Penalty Imposed, 80 A.L.R.3D 1220, 1223-25 (1977).
143. See COOLEY, supra note 30, § 162, at 491 ("A municipality is not indictable for a felony,
since it is incapable of felonious intent, and can neither be hanged nor imprisoned.").
144. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b)(1) (1988) (stating that "any per-
son who knowingly violates" certain provisions of the Act "shall, upon conviction, be fined not
more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both" (emphasis added)); Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (c)(1) (1988) (punishing violations of various provisions "by a fine of
not more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by
both" (emphasis added)).
146. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § I (Supp. 1992) (stating that upon conviction, defendant
"shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person,
$350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court" (emphasis added)).
147. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988).
148. See supra notes 145-46.
149. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (emphasis added).
150. The Supreme Court, per Justice Holmes, accepted a precisely analogous argument in
United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 55 (1909) ("[The natural inference, when a
statute prescribes two independent penalties [one of which is applicable to corporations and one
of which is not], is that it means to inflict them so far as it can, and that if one of them is
impossible, it does not mean on that account to let the defendant escape"); accord People v.
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B. Local Governmental Immunity
Assuming that the language of various federal statutes theoretically al-
lows for the criminal prosecution of local governments, the next question is
whether such entities nevertheless enjoy governmental immunity from pros-
ecution. The analysis here consists of two steps. First, do local govern-
ments enjoy general immunity from all federal criminal prosecution?
Second, even if local governments are not generally immune, do they enjoy
immunity from prosecutions brought under certain statutes or when acting
in certain capacities?
1. General Immunity from Criminal Prosecution
Neither Little Rock Sewer Committee151 nor City of Rancho Palos
Verdes 1 2-the two reported cases involving the federal criminal prosecu-
tion of a local government-deals with the question of immunity. As ex-
plained in Part I, it was widely held in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries that cities were immune from state prosecution for all crimes in-
volving either criminal intent153 or a governmental or discretionary func-
tion.1 54 Assuming that such doctrines of governmental immunity did make
sense in the nineteenth-century state context, one must ask whether munici-
palities should today be immune from federal criminal prosecution accord-
ing to an analogous scheme. 55
a. Municipalities and the Formation of Criminal Intent
If municipalities were incapable of forming criminal intent as a matter
of law, they would be effectively immunized from prosecution under any
criminal statute requiring a showing of mens rea.156 At first glance, the
Charter Thrift & Loan, 106 Cal. Rptr. 364, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (following the holding in
Union Supply).
151. United States v. Little Rock Sewer Comm., 460 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ark. 1978); see also
infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
152. United States v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 841 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1988); see also
supra text accompanying notes 113-16.
153. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 74, 87 and accompanying text.
155. Technically, "[m]unicipal defenses-including an assertion of sovereign immunity-to
a federal right of action are... controlled by federal law." Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622, 647 n.30 (1980).
156. Of course, many criminal statutory provisions do not require a showing of mens rea. See,
e.g., Clean Water Act, § 309(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Oil Pollution
Act of 1990, § 4301(c) (amending § 309(c) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992)); Act of Nov. 15, 1990, § 701 (amending § 113(c)(4) of the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7401-642 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). To the extent that mens rea is not a requirement of
such crimes, a defendant's supposed inability to form criminal intent would obviously not be an
issue, just as it was not issue in those 19th- and early 20th-century cases in which municipalities
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Supreme Court's opinion in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.157 and a
line of lower court cases involving the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations ("RICO") statute 158 suggest that municipalities are indeed in-
capable of forming mens rea. Upon closer examination, however, none of
these cases compels the conclusion that municipalities are per se immune
from prosecution for such crimes.
In City of Newport, the Court held that municipalities are immune
from punitive damage actions brought by private plaintiffs under § 1983.159
In reaching this conclusion, the Court did what it frequently does in such
cases-it examined the meaning of the applicable statute at the time it was
enacted. 160 The Court found that, in 1871, when Congress passed the fore-
runner of § 1983, municipalities (like other "corporate" entities) were con-
sidered incapable of forming the mental intent that is a necessary element of
punitive damages actions161 -a mental intent similar to the intent that is an
element of most crimes. 162
Despite the Court's primarily historical approach, many lower
courts
16 3 have read City of Newport more broadly to suggest that municipal-
were prosecuted for non-mens rea, "regulatory" crimes. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying
text.
157. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
158. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see also cases cited infra note 163.
159. City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 271.
160. Id. at 258-66.
161. Id. at 267 ("If a government official acts knowingly and maliciously to deprive others of
their civil rights, he may become the appropriate object of the community's vindictive sentiments.
A municipality, however, can have no malice independent of the malice of its officials").
162. For a discussion of what criminal intent means in the antitrust, environmental, and civil
rights contexts, respectively, see George E. Garvey, The Sherman Act and the Vicious Will: Devel-
oping Standards for Criminal Intent in Sherman Act Prosecutions, 29 CAm. U. L. REv. 389, 423-
25 (1980); Jane F. Barrett & Veronica M. Clarke, Perspectives on the Knowledge Requirements of
Section 6928(d) of RCRA After United States v. Dee, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 862, 871-74 (1991);
Frederick M. Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of Federal Civil Rights
Crimes, 67 TUL. L. REv. 2113, 2200-24 (1993).
163. See, e.g., Lancaster Community Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397,404
(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1168 (1992); County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 784 F.
Supp. 1275, 1283 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Nu-Life Const. Corp. v. Board of Educ., 779 F. Supp. 248,
252 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); 0 & K Trojan, Inc. v. Municipal Contractors Equip. Corp., 751 F. Supp.
431, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Smallwood v. Jefferson County Gov't, 743 F. Supp. 502, 504 (W.D.
Ky. 1990); Bonsall Village, Inc. v. Patterson, No. Civ. A. 90-0457, 1990 WL 139383, at *6 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 19, 1990); Scott v. Township of Bristol, Civ. A. No. 90-1412, 1990 WL 178556, at *8
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 1990); Bryant v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. A. No. 89-6005, 1990 WL 82099, at
*6, *8 n.5 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 1990); North Star Contracting Corp. v. Long Island R.R., 723 F.
Supp. 902, 907 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Albanese v. City Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc., 710 F. Supp. 563,
567-68 (D.N.J. 1989); Victor v. White, No. C-88-3350-DLJ, 1989 WL 108276, at *6 (N.D. Cal.,
July 26, 1989); In re Citisource, Inc. Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1069, 1080-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1988);
Massey v. Oklahoma City, 643 F. Supp. 81, 85 (W.D. Okla. 1986).
A notable exception to this line of authority is the Third Circuit's thoughtful opinion in Genty
v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 903 n.1 (3d Cir. 1991). The court agreed that municipal-
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ities are incapable of forming mens rea164 even under more modem statutes,
such as civil RICO. 65 For several reasons, however, it is incorrect to read
City of Newport as establishing a per se barrier to the criminal prosecution
of local governments under federal law.
First, simply because municipal corporations were considered incapa-
ble of forming malicious intent at the time the Reconstruction-era civil
rights statutes were originally enacted does not necessarily mean that they
should still be considered incapable of committing a malice crime. In 1871,
by which time the distinction between governmental and business corpora-
tions had begun to erode,1 66 both kinds of corporations were still considered
incapable of forming mens rea.167 In the years since, however, it has be-
come well established that private business corporations-through the con-
duct of their agents and employees-can be guilty of crimes involving
knowledge and willfulness.1 68 As a result, for City of Newport to stand for
the proposition that, unlike private corporations, governmental entities are
incapable of forming mens rea-at least under more modem criminal stat-
ities are immune from punitive damages actions under RICO, but it did so on legislative intent
grounds and specifically declined to rely on the argument that municipalities are per se incapable
of forming mens rea. Id. at 906-14.
164. The issue of mens rea-forming ability arises because one of the elements of a civil RICO
claim is that the defendant have committed one of several predicate criminal offenses. See 18
U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (listing offenses that qualify as "racketeering activity").
To prove that a defendant has committed one of these predicate offenses, the defendant must have
had the criminal intent required to commit the underlying offense. See, e.g., Lancaster Commu.
nity Hosp., 940 F.2d at 404. Thus, when the RICO defendant is a municipality, the plaintiff must
show that the municipality has formed criminal intent.
165. In fairness to these lower courts, however, it should be noted that City of Newport seems
to invite such a broad reading. The opinion includes a discussion of the policy reasons for immu-
nizing municipalities from punitive damages actions, a discussion that extends beyond the narrow
historical grounds that form the principal basis for the Court's holding. See infra notes 251, 255,
272 and accompanying text.
166. See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Nar-
row Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Juris-
diction, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1033, 1101 (1983) ("As if to signal the clarity with which lawyers by
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had begun to see municipal corporations as a
distinct legal form, a number of treatises devoted solely to municipal corporations appeared, be-
ginning with John Dillon's Municipal Corporations in 1872.").
167. See CLARK, supra note 30, § 42; 2 DILLON, supra note 30, § 746.
168. See, e.g., Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369, 378-80 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
788 (1943); Mininsohn v. United States, 101 F.2d 477, 478 (3d Cir. 1939); accord People v.
Charter Thrift & Loan, 106 Cal. Rptr. 364, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973); Commonwealth v. Benefi-
cial Fin. Co., 275 N.E.2d 33. 80, 86 (Mass. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 914 (1972); see also
James J. Brosnahan et al, Corporate Criminal Liability and Procedure, in WHrm COLLAR CRIMES
187, 189 (Gary P. Naftalis ed., 1980) ("It is now well settled, however, that a corporation through
the conduct of its agents and employees, may be guilty of crimes involving knowledge and will-
fulness.") (footnote omitted).
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utes' 69 -there needs to be some theory explaining the distinction between
private corporations and governmental entities in this respect.
The Supreme Court's theory was that the malice of officials should not
be imputed to the taxpaying citizens of the community. To do so would
place the consequences of such attribution-namely, punitive damages-
"upon the shoulders of blameless or unknowing taxpayers." 7' Yet this ar-
gument clearly places the conceptual cart before the horse. Regardless of
whether legitimate policy reasons exist for relieving taxpayers of such a
burden, 7 ' this concern is very different from saying that governmental enti-
ties are, as a matter of law, incapable of forming willful intent.
Outside the criminal law, intentions, motives, and other mental states
are regularly attributed to governmental entities.'7 2 Courts have had little
difficulty finding, for example, that the State of California intended to
169. Under the Court's historical approach, courts should construe criminal statutes enacted in
the mid-19th century or earlier (unlike more modem statutes) to preclude criminal liability against
municipalities (as well as against business corporations). This is clearly not an issue in the case of
the major environmental statutes, which were enacted in the 1970s and 1980s. Nor is it an issue in
the case of the Sherman Act, which was passed in 1890 and which made explicit reference to
"corporations." See 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1988); see also United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d
1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1972) ("Despite the fact that 'the doctrine of corporate criminal responsibility
for the acts of the officers was not well established in 1890,' the [Sherman] Act expressly applies
to corporate entities.") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). It is somewhat less
obvious why it is not an issue in the case of 18 U.S.C. § 242, the criminal analogue of § 1983, the
first version of which was enacted during Reconstruction. For an explanation of why this histori-
cal approach would not preclude § 242 from being applied to municipalities, see infra notes 199-
205 and accompanying text.
170. See City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 267; see also Albanese v. City Fed. Say. & Loan
Assoc., 710 F. Supp. 563, 567 (D.N.J. 1989) (declining to attribute criminal intent to municipal
corporation for this reason) (quoting Newport).
171. Although municipalities are immune from punitive damage actions in most states as well,
see City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 260-62 & n.21; 18 MCQUlLIN, supra note 15, § 53.18a; Joel E.
Smith, Annotation, Recovery of Exemplary or Punitive Damages From Municipal Corporation, 1
A.L.R.4TH 448, 454-61 (1980), such immunity is usually based on public policy concerns about
imposing such damages on municipalities, rather than on any theory about the capacity of munici-
palities to form mens rea. See, e.g., Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965)
(maintaining that because the purpose of punitive damages is punishment, the people who would
bear the burden of the award, the citizens, were the same group of people who were expected to
benefit from the public example which the punishment made of the wrongdoer); City of Ham-
mond v. Conley, 498 N.E.2d 48, 53 (Ind. App. 1986); City of Gary v. Falcone, 348 N.E.2d 41, 42
(Ind. App. 1976); Ranells v. Cleveland, 321 N.E.2d 885, 889 (Ohio 1975); Nixon v. Oklahoma,
555 P.2d 1283, 1285-86 (Okla. 1976).
172. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 845, 865 (1992) ("[A]scribing purposes to groups and institutions is a complex
business, and one that is often difficult to describe abstractly. But that fact does not make such
ascriptions improper. In practice, we ascribe purposes to group activities all the time without
many practical difficulties."); see also Seth F. Kreimer, Note, Reading the Mind of the School
Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317, 332-43
(1976) (describing intent of school board in school desegregation case as metaphor in which insti-
tution is viewed as single actor, not reduced to individual states of mind).
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maintain resale prices through its wholesale wine pricing system,173 or that
the City of Centralia, Illinois, was negligent in failing to maintain the cover
on a sewer manhole into which a person fell and was injured.174
Under traditional criminal-law doctrines, criminal intent and liability
can be imputed to a corporation either directly, when high-level employees
of the defendant entity have adopted policies that authorize or recklessly
tolerate the criminal conduct, 75 or vicariously, through an employee's ac-
tions within the scope of her office. 176 In United States v. Little Rock Sewer
Committee,177 for example, a federal district court had no difficulty finding
that the defendant municipal Sewer Committee manifested criminal intent
when it failed to file the proper discharge monitoring reports required under
CERCLA. 178 Nor should there be any theoretical barrier to applying these
criminal law principles in other cases involving municipal defendants.
179
A second, and perhaps more important, reason to find no per se barrier
is that City of Newport and the RICO cases all involved immunity from
damage actions brought by private plaintiffs. Such cases say little about
immunity from criminal prosecutions brought by the federal government.
Although local governments have always enjoyed a considerable degree of
immunity from private actions, there are only a few instances in which such
entities have enjoyed immunity from government-initiated actions. 80 And
173. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980).
174. Marshall v. City of Centralia, 570 N.E.2d 315, 319-20 (I11. 1991).
175. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (1985) ("A corporation may be convicted of the
commission of an offense if: the commission of the offense was authorized, requested, com-
manded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent
acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or employment."); 2 CHARLES E.
TonIN, WHARTON'S CPunumA. LAw § 111 (14th ed. 1979).
176. See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.07(I)(a) (1985) ("A corporation may be convicted of the
commission of an offense if: the conduct is performed by an agent of the corporation acting in
behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or employment."); 2 TOREIN, supra note
175, § 111.
177. 460 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
178. Although the court relied on a vicarious liability theory, id. at 9, it could just as easily
have found criminal intent directly, given that the plant manager responsible for the city's failure
to file was considered a "high-level" employee. Id. at 7.
179. As Part II argues, however, criminal liability for municipalities probably should, for
policy reasons, be limited to cases of direct, non-vicarious intent. See infra note 242.
180. The three instances of municipal immunity from federal suit identified herein are: (1)
certain narrow exemptions from municipal liability under CERCLA, discussed infra note 195; (2)
immunity from federally brought damages suits under the Local Government Antitrust Act, dis-
cussed infra note 207 and accompanying text; and (3) the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,
discussed supra note 117. Cf. Welch v. Tex. Highways & Pub. Transp. Dep't, 483 U.S. 468, 487
(1987) ("The contours of state sovereign immunity are determined by the structure and require-
ments of the federal system.... [T]he United States may sue a State, because that is 'inherent in
the Constitutional plan.' . .. Absent such a provision, ' "the permanence of the Union might be
endangered."' ") (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
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in each of these instances, immunity was based on specific statutory
authority.' 8'
Moreover, municipal immunity is likely to be particularly disfavored
in the criminal context. The Supreme Court has frequently noted that even
when immune from civil damages actions, local officials are nonetheless
subject to federal criminal prosecution.' 8 2 Indeed, such liability occurs
even with regard to "legislative acts" that, in the civil context, almost cer-
tainly would be immunized.'8 3
In addition, the prosecution of local governmental entities would pose
no greater threat to principles of federalism than would the prosecution of
local governmental officials.' 84 Indeed, the opposite may be true. As the
Supreme Court recognized in Spallone v. United States,' fines aimed at
individual public officials are likely to work a greater intrusion into the
181. See supra note 180.
182. See, e.g., Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 n.5 (1980) (explaining that state judge may
be found criminally liable under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for violating a person's civil rights even though
he may be immune from damages action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); United States v. Gillock, 445
U.S. 360, 372 (1980) ("[Ihe cases in this Court which have recognized an immunity from civil
suit for state officials have presumed the existence of federal criminal liability as a restraining
factor on the conduct of state officials."); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976) ("Even
judges, cloaked with absolute civil immunity for centuries, could be punished criminally for will-
ful deprivations of constitutional rights on the strength of 18 U.S.C. § 242, the criminal analog of
§ 1983.") (footnote omitted); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974) ("Tihe judicially
fashioned doctrine of official immunity does not reach 'so far as to immunize criminal conduct
proscribed by an Act of Congress ....') (quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 627
(1972)). But see United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 143 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winter, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing, on federalism grounds, against expansive use of
federal mail fraud statute in case involving chairman of local Republican Committee and sug-
gesting that local corruption is more appropriately dealt with through the political process), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); Ralph E. Loomis, Comment, Federal Prosecution of Elected State
Officials for Mail Fraud: Creative Prosecution or an Affront to Federalism?, 28 AM. U. L. REv.
63, 74-77 (1978) (arguing that federal criminal prosecution of local officials for essentially local
offenses poses threat to federalism).
183. See Gillock, 445 U.S. at 373 (holding in federal criminal prosecution against state legisla-
tor that there is no legislative privilege barring the introduction of evidence of the legislative acts
of the legislator because "recognition of an evidentiary privilege for state legislators for their
legislative acts would impair the legitimate interests of the Federal Government in enforcing its
criminal statutes with only speculative benefit to the state legislative process").
184. This assumes, of course, that the federal criminal prosecution of local officials itself does
not pose a substantial federalism problem. See supra note 182; cf. sources cited infra note 216.
185. 493 U.S. 265 (1990). A consent decree between the City of Yonkers and the Depart-
ment of Justice provided that the city, through its elected council, would adopt an ordinance
implementing a plan to build low-income housing in predominantly white sections of Yonkers.
Id. at 270. Confronted with public opposition to the decree, a majority of the members of the city
council balked at promulgating the promised legislation. Id. at 271-72. As a result of the coun-
cil's failure to honor the consent decree, the district court imposed fines on both the city and each
recalcitrant city council member. ld. at 272. The Court held that the district court had abused its
discretion in fining the individual council members, though not the city itself. Id. at 276-80. The
Court found that it was reasonably probable that the process of fining the city would effectuate
compliance with the consent decree. See id. at 277-78.
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political process than fines applicable to governmental entities.' 86 Impos-
ing sanctions on individual officials creates a conflict of interest for those
officials, because they are forced to act in their own self-interest, rather than
in the best interests of the entity they represent. When a fine is aimed at an
entity instead, legislators who vote to comply with the court order may be
voting against their personal desires, but they do so for the city's financial
good, not their own. Thus, according to the Court, sanctions aimed at indi-
vidual officials are more politically intrusive than sanctions aimed at the
governmental entity and should be used only as a last resort.'
87
b. The Governmental/Proprietary and Discretionary/Ministerial
Distinctions as a Basis for Immunity
As Part I explains, under nineteenth-century law, local governments
were immune from state criminal prosecution to the extent that they were
acting in a "governmental" or "discretionary" capacity. 88 In some states,
municipalities continue to be immune from tort liability when acting in
these capacities.' 89 As this section suggests, however, little reason exists
for adopting such distinctions in the context of federal criminal prosecution.
First, when a prosecution against a local government is brought by the
federal government rather than by a state, there is no danger of "self-prose-
cution," because the federal and local governments have vastly different
constituencies.' 90 Hence, one of the original reasons for distinguishing be-
tween governmental and proprietary functions in the context of state crimi-
nal prosecution of local municipalities 9 ' does not apply in the federal
context.
Second, in light of the serious difficulties it poses in application, the
governmental/proprietary distinction has come under almost overwhelming
attack in the tort context.'92 The distinction seems particularly difficult to
sustain now that governmental corporations have taken on an increasing
186. Id. at 280.
187. Id.
188. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 72-73.
190. Cf. Ronald A. Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1110,
1166-67 n.217 (1981) (asserting that criminal sanctions are most likely to be applied against local
officials when there is "a great difference in the constituencies of a prosecutor and defendant-
official," as there is in the case of a federal prosecution).
191. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955) (on reh'g) (criticiz-
ing the governmental/nongovernmental distinction as a "quagmire that has long plagued the law of
municipal corporations"); Austin v. City of Baltimore, 405 A.2d 255, 259 (Md. 1979) (observing
that the governmental/proprietary distinction is "'sometimes illusory in practice"') (quoting E.
Eyring Co. v. City of Baltimore, 252 A.2d 824, 825 (Md. 1969)); Repko, supra note 65, at 219-22
(discussing the governmental/proprietary distinction); Murray Seasongood, Municipal Corpora-
tions: Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test, 22 VA. L. REv. 910, 938 (1936) (not-
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number of historically private functions' 93 and private corporations have
taken on many traditionally governmental functions. 194 The usual solution
abandons the distinction altogether and makes local governments uniformly
subject to liability, regardless of the capacity in which they have acted.19
A third reason argues for the abandonment of immunity that is based
on the distinction between discretionary and ministerial functions. In the
days when municipalities were prosecuted for non-mens rea "crimes," such
as failing to build a road or repair a bridge, 196 it was appropriate to allow a
defendant to argue that its conduct resulted from a legitimate discretionary
decision about how to allocate limited funds. Such a distinction may well
make sense in the context of the Federal Tort Claims Act.197 In the context
of crimes involving an element of intent, however, such arguments seem
out of place. Municipalities, like private corporations, may face difficult
decisions about how to allocate their financial resources so as to maximize
the benefit to their constituents. For example, a municipality might have to
choose between spending tax dollars on the implementation of environmen-
tal controls and funding teacher training programs that would benefit its
high school students. Either expenditure would be a worthwhile one. But
in cases where federal criminal law dictates one of the municipality's
choices-for example, if federal criminal law prohibited the municipality
from willfully falling to maintain certain environmental standards-it
seems implausible that the municipality should be permitted to argue in
ing that the "rules sought to be established are as logical as those governing French irregular
verbs.").
193. See, e.g., HARPER Ear AL., supra note 72, § 29.6, at 629; Gar Alperovitz, How Cities Make
Money, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 1994, at A23.
194. See, e.g., William Celis 3d, Private Groups to Run 15 Schools in Experiment by Massa-
chusetts, N.Y. TIMEs, March 19, 1994, at Al; Mary Jordan, Minneapolis Votes to Hire Firm to
Run City Schools, WASH. PosT, Nov. 5, 1993, at Al; Robert O'Harrow, Jr., More and More, the
Business of Government Is Run by Business, WASH. POsr, Apr. 24, 1994, at B1; Steve Stecklow,
Private Groups Compete for the Chance to Create New Schools With Public Funds, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 24, 1994, at B1; Martin Tolchin, Localities Shift to Private Firefighters, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
1985, at 22.
195. See, e.g., Note, supra note 67, at 639 n.2 (detailing instances in which states have abol-
ished, or virtually abolished, doctrine of municipal tort immunity for governmental functions).
This does not, however, deny the possibility that Congress might wisely choose to carve out
certain narrow "governmental function" immunities that would apply to municipalities in the
criminal context. Cf. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1988) (excepting from certain civil
liability provisions of the Act a state or local government that acquires ownership or control of a
facility involuntarily "by virtue of its function as a sovereign"); id. § 9607(d)(2) (excepting state
or local governments from certain civil liability provisions of Act for "actions taken in response to
an emergency created by the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance generated by
or from a facility owned by another person").
196. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
197. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988) (stating that the Act does not apply to claims based on
"exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty").
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favor of its discretionary power to engage in an intentional violation of the
law.
2. Municipal Immunity From Criminal Prosecution Under
Certain Statutes
To say that local governments enjoy no broad-sweeping immunity
from all prosecutions involving either mens rea crimes or governmental or
discretionary functions does not foreclose the possibility that such entities
might be immune from criminal prosecution in more limited contexts. It is
necessary to examine the various criminal statutes individually to determine
if some more specific basis for immunity exists. In this context, two issues
warrant consideration. The first concerns the possibility that, even if the
Supreme Court's opinion in City of Newport does not make municipalities
generally immune from criminal prosecution, it might nevertheless create
immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 242. The second concerns the possibility that
municipalities might be immune from Sherman Act criminal prosecution by
virtue of the Local Government Antitrust Act. 198
As noted above, the Supreme Court's approach to the question of lia-
bility under the civil rights statutes has generally been historical.199 In City
of Newport, it reasoned that § 1983 should be interpreted to preclude puni-
tive damage liability against municipalities because, during Reconstruction,
when the predecessor to § 1983 was enacted, municipalities and other kinds
of corporate entities were considered incapable of forming the mental intent
required in punitive damage actions.2°" The first precursor to § 242-the
criminal analogue to § 1983-was also enacted during Reconstruction.20'
Thus, following the Court's historical approach to such questions, it might
be assumed that municipalities would also be immune from criminal prose-
cution under § 242.
This assumption would be mistaken, however. The original 1866 ver-
sion of § 242 contained no mens rea or criminal intent requirement; 20 2 nor
did the 1870 version of the law.20 3 Congress did not add the requirement of
198. 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1988). As explained supra note 129, it is clear that, under the
Parker doctrine, municipalities are immune from antitrust liability-whether criminal or civil-
when acting pursuant to "clearly articulated" state policy. The question considered here is
whether, under the Local Government Act, municipalities are immune from criminal liability even
when Parker immunity does not apply.
199. See supra note 160 and accompanying text; see also Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 38-51
(1983) (employing historical approach to reach the conclusion that punitive damages are available
against individual defendants).
200. See supra note 161.
201. See § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
202. See id.
203. See § 17 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
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"willfulness" to the statute until 1909.2" By then, corporations were much
more likely to be held capable of forming criminal intent than they were at
the time of Reconstruction.205 Therefore, no inconsistency exists between
this historical approach to interpreting the civil rights statutes and subject-
ing municipalities to criminal prosecution under § 242.
The second question concerns the possibility that, even if the criminal
provisions of the Sherman Act apply to municipalities, 0 6 such entities
would nonetheless be immune from criminal prosecution by virtue of the
Local Government Antitrust Act ("the Act").20 7 The Act immunizes cities,
counties, villages, school districts, and other local governments from treble
damages suits brought by private plaintiffs, actual damages suits brought by
states, and actual damages suits brought by the federal government.20 The
Act does not immunize such entities from civil injunctive and declaratory
suits brought by the federal government. 20 9
However, the Act says nothing about whether local governments are
immune from federal criminal prosecution. The legislative history indi-
cates that the Act was not intended to immunize from criminal prosecution
municipal officials acting outside their authority.21 0 But it does not con-
sider the possibility that a prosecution might be brought against a munici-
pality acting according to some express or implied policy.
204. See 35 Stat. 1092 (1909). For a discussion of the legislative history of what is now
§ 242, see United States v. Screws, 325 U.S. 91, 98-107 (1945) (plurality opinion); Lawrence,
supra note 162, at 2180-81.
205. In 1909, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of New York Central & Hudson
River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494-95 (1909), which upheld the constitutionality of
ascribing to a corporation the criminal intent of its agents. Although courts continued, for some
time, to say that corporations were incapable of committing what the New York Central Court
rather vaguely called "some crimes," id. at 494, it is unlikely that criminal violations of the civil
rights laws were among these. See, e.g., United States v. John Kelso Co., 86 F. 304, 306 (N.D.
Cal. 1898) (excluding bigamy, perjury, rape, and murder, but not civil rights violations, from the
list of crimes of which corporations could be found guilty).
206. See discussion supra notes 120-31 and accompanying text.
207. 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1988).
208. Id.; Carol F. Lee, The Political Safeguards of Federalism? Congressional Responses to
Supreme Court Decisions on State and Local Liability, 20 URB. LAW. 301, 320 (1988). Congress
enacted the Local Government Antitrust Act following the Supreme Court's opinion in Commu-
nity Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1982), which held that the
general authority provided under a state's home rule statute did not immunize a city from the
possibility of enormous treble damages liability.
209. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1988); see also Lee, supra note 208, at 320 ("[The Act] re-
stored the power of federal antitrust authorities to seek injunctive relief .... ").
210. See H.R. REP. No. 965, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 20 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4602, 4621 ("[Plarticipation in criminal acts, or other behavior clearly falling outside a local
government's authority, would fall outside the definition of official conduct."); CoNG. REc.
H12,182 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Rep. Rodino) ("Actions of officials that fall
outside a local government's authority, such as participation in criminal acts, would fall outside
the protection of this section.").
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Congress passed the Local Government Act with the express purpose
of protecting municipalities from potentially bankrupting treble damages
actions brought by private plaintiffs.211 At the time the Act was passed, a
municipality was more likely to be bankrupted by treble damages (which
are awarded only in civil suits212) than by the criminal fines then available
under the Sherman Act. Since passage of the Act, however, Congress has
amended the Sherman Act to allow criminal fines ten times larger than pre-
viously permitted.213 Thus, there is a reasonable, if inconclusive, argument,
based on the "spirit" of the Local Government Act, that municipalities
should be immune from federal antitrust criminal prosecution.21 4
III. POLICY ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
The last thirty years have seen significant growth in the use of the
federal criminal laws against both private corporations and their employ-
ees215 and against local governmental officials.216 For the purposes of this
Article, it is accepted that certain serious cases of environmental, civil
211. See Lee, supra note 208, at 311-33 (reviewing legislative history of Act).
212. See 2 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW §§ 308, 313, 311a, 331
(1978) (asserting that treble damages may be awarded only in private actions).
213. The Sherman Act Amendments increased the maximum fine available against a corporate
defendant from one million to ten million dollars. Antitrust Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L.
101-588, § 4(a), 104 Stat. 2879, 2880 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV 1992)).
214. For a further discussion of how criminal fines compare to civil damage awards in terms
of their respective potential to "bankrupt" a municipal defendant, see infra note 254 and accompa-
nying text.
215. See John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn; No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry
Into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. Rav. 386, 444-48 (1981); Reinier H.
Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 793, 857,
897 (1984); Victor H. Kramer, Comment, Criminal Prosecutions for Violations of the Sherman
Act: In Search of a Policy, 48 Gao. L.J. 530, 539 (1960); Developments in the Law-Corporate
Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227,
1229-30 (1979); Note, Increasing Community Control Over Corporate Crime-A Problem in the
Law of Sanctions, 71 YALE L.J. 280, 305 (1961).
216. See Michael W. Carey et al., Federal Prosecution of State and Local Public Officials:
The Obstacles to Punishing Breaches of the Public Trust and a Proposal for Reform, Part 1, 94
W. VA. L. REV. 301, 318-24 (1991-92); Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for
Federal Prosecution of State and Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 367, 381-406 (1989);
Charles F.C. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the Making of Law
Enforcement Policy, 65 GEo. L.J. 1171, 1193-96 (1977); Charles N. Whitaker, Note, Federal
Prosecution of State and Local Bribery: Inappropriate Tools and the Need for a Structured Ap-
proach, 78 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1617 (1992).
As these sources indicate, the focus of most scholarly attention in this area has been on the
prosecution of local officials for crimes such as bribery and fraud. However, local officials have
been prosecuted for other crimes as well, such as for violations of the civil rights laws, see supra
note 136, and the environmental laws, see United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1034-35 (9th
Cir. 1989) (affirming conviction of director of city public works department for violating laws
concerning disposal of hazardous wastes and burial of sludge), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990).
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rights, and antitrust illegality should be addressed by means of criminal
sanctions.
217
Considerable evidence suggests that local governments engage in be-
havior that may be viewed as criminal. For example, it is now widely rec-
ognized that local governments and their agencies are among the nation's
worst polluters,218 that they engage in serious antitrust violations,219 and
that they adopt or condone policies which result in pernicious civil rights
violations.220 Such acts go beyond what was considered criminal for mu-
nicipalities in the nineteenth century.221 In some cases, these acts involve
willful and knowing violations of the law, dictated or tolerated by official
policy.
222
Recognizing that municipalities violate the law, however, does not
necessarily entail that they should be criminally prosecuted. Under the cur-
rent system, local governments are subject to damage remedies in tort223 as
However, there do not appear to be any cases in which local officials have been prosecuted under
antitrust laws.
When towns dump sewage or fix prices, they may well do so as a result of a collective
decisionmaking process. When a city mayor or police chief takes a bribe, however, she is more
likely to act on her own. But see Cindy Loose, 5 D.C. Housing Employees Charged, WASH. POsr,
Apr. 13, 1994, at Al (reporting on federal criminal charges brought against head of District of
Columbia subsidized housing program and four of her deputies for corruption so rampant that
nearly everyone who benefited from the program during the last four years did so by bribing city
officials). Cf. Joe Sexton, New York Police Often Lie Under Oath, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
22, 1994, at Al (summarizing mayoral commission draft report finding that New York city police
often make false arrests, tamper with evidence, and commit perjury, and that such practices are
condoned by superior officers). Thus, in general, the prosecution of local governments would
seem to make more sense in the environmental, antitrust, and civil rights context than in the
corruption context. Cf. Carey et al., supra, at 312-13 (suggesting that federal criminal prosecution
of local governmental officials is more appropriate in cases involving bribery and corruption than
in cases involving other crimes because such crimes pose a greater threat to democratic principles,
which itself is of federal concern); Kurland, supra, at 415-70 (asserting that the federal govern-
ment's power to prosecute local officials in corruption cases is based on its constitutional interest
in preserving republican form of government at local level).
217. As described supra note 20, however, the Article is not intended to suggest either that
acts not already regarded as criminal should be criminalized or that the criminal prosecution of
local governments should be anything other than a last resort.
218. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 842 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (en
banc), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 739 F.2d 993) (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (en banc),
discussed supra notes 3-10 and accompanying text.
223. See SCHUCK, supra note 65, at 46 (1983); William F. Baxter, Enterprise Liability, Public
and Private, 42 LAw & COr-EMP. PROBs. 45, 48 (1978); Cass, supra note 190, at 1180; Kenneth
C. Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEx. L. Rav. 703,717-22 (1974); Caleb
Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MiN. L. Rav. 493, 514-15
(1955); Louis F. Jaffe, Suits Against Government and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARv. L.
Rv. 209, 229-30 (1963); Jerry L. Mashaw, Civil Liability of Government Officers: Property
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well as civil fines. 22 4 Because municipalities cannot be imprisoned, the
only kinds of penalties that courts can apply to them are monetary-civil
damages, civil fines and criminal fines-and probationary. 22 Unless crim-
inal fines and probation further some policy goal that civil fines do not,
there would be no logical explanation for their being applied to
municipalities.
Moreover, even if one accepts the view that criminal penalties are ap-
propriate when governmental entities engage in criminal acts, one need not
agree that such sanctions should be imposed on the entity itself. After all,
municipalities can act only through the agency of individual officials. Be-
cause local governmental officials are regularly subject to criminal sanc-
tions, it might be argued that the desirable effects of criminal sanctions are
achieved more sensibly through criminal prosecution of the responsible
official.
Indeed, one might think that a municipality would make a particularly
poor candidate for treatment as a criminal. The criminal law intends, after
all, to protect the public interest. Municipalities represent the public; there-
fore, it might be argued that prosecution of the municipality would be
counterproductive. Moreover, many people who live within the boundaries
of the lawbreaking municipality might not approve of its policies. To brand
the municipality a "criminal" would be tantamount to branding all of the
people who live within the municipality "criminal." Accordingly, criminal
prosecution of the municipality might also be perceived as unjust.
In an attempt to sort out these issues, this section offers three basic
arguments. First, local governments can be the appropriate object of the
stigma and moral condemnation that usually accompany criminal prosecu-
tion.226 Second, in certain cases-such as when a local government has
systematically adopted or condoned a policy that leads to a violation, and
individual officials are merely the immediate agents of the violation-pros-
ecution of the responsible entity may well be fairer than prosecution of the
individual officials. 227 Third, imposing criminal liability on local govern-
ments may be more efficient than imposing such liability on officials, be-
Rights and Official Accountability, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 8, 22 (1978); Jon 0. Newman,
Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law En-
forcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE LJ. 447, 450-51 (1978).
224. E.g., Atchison v. Barry, No. I1976-CA-88 (D.C. Super. Ct.) (Order of Dec. 21, 1989, 11
10-13) (described in WASHINGTON LEGAL CLINIC FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 16, at 53);
Nancy Lewis, Judge, Tired of Waiting, May Sock D.C. With Fine, WASH. POST, July 28, 1993, at
B6 (addressing the imposition of fines in Jerry M. v. District of Columbia, 571 A.2d 178 (D.C.
1990)).
225. As discussed infra note 244, the penalty imposed by the court in Little Rock Sewer Com-
mittee was probation.
226. See infra notes 229-50 and accompanying text.
227. See infra notes 252-53, 257-63 and accompanying text.
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cause it would encourage local governments to adopt internal controls on
illegal conduct and would provide a more easily identifiable, and perhaps
more readily convictable, defendant.22"
A. Local Governments as Appropriate Objects of Criminal Sanctions
As Professor Wolfgang Friedmann observed, "the main purpose of a
[criminal] fine is not primarily to hurt the defendant financially .... It is to
attach a stigma-pronounced by independent law courts-on the breach of
legal obligations which have been imposed in the interest of the commu-
nity." '229 The creation of stigma is a crucial factor in accomplishing two
important objectives of the criminal law. The first is general deterrence-
the idea that the punishment criminals suffer serves to deter others from
committing similar crimes.23° The second is retribution-the idea that
criminals should receive their "just deserts" and that punishment is neces-
sary to restore order and maintain society's respect for the law.231 Indeed,
228. See infra notes 264-73 and accompanying text. The Article contemplates a scheme under
which prosecutions would be brought against local governments rather than, or in addition to, the
officials who work for them. The determination of which of these two options should be pursued
would be determined on a case-by-case basis. For example, if a municipality adopted policies that
led to criminal activity and there were no individual officials who bore particular responsibility for
such policies or acts, then the municipality alone should be prosecuted. Conversely, if an entity
adopted crime-encouraging or -tolerating policies and there were individuals who were especially
culpable, then the prosecution should be brought against both the entity and the officials.
It is acknowledged, however, that some of the policy arguments offered in the text below
may be more relevant to those circumstances in which only the municipality (and not any individ-
uals) would be prosecuted. See, e.g., infra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
229. FRiEDMANN, supra note 15, at 211.
230. See WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AusTiN W. ScoTr, JR., CRIMiNAL LAW 24 (2d ed. 1986). The
extent to which a punishment acts as a deterrent is often expressed as a function of the type and
magnitude of the punishment and the probability that the crime will be discovered and punished.
Id. at 25.
231. Id. at 25-26. The retribution theory of punishment has enjoyed a significant revival in
recent years. See, e.g., Jean Hampton, Correcting Wrongs Versus Righting Wrongs, 39 UCLA L.
REv. 1659, 1685-98 (1992). In the case of corporate defendants, however, the majority view
among scholars continues to be that deterrence is the more important policy goal. See Harvey L.
Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Mischief Afoot: The Need for Incentives to Control Corporate
Criminal Conduct, 71 B.U. L. REv. 447, 449-50 & n. 20 (1991) (citing literature). But see Kip
SCHLEGEL, JUST DESERTS FOR CoRpoRArE CRiMINALs 53-74 (1990) (emphasizing the importance
of retributive principles in corporate punishment); Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Crimi-
nal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1141, 1167-85
(same).
Other criminal law rationales that are often mentioned include prevention or specific deter-
rence (deterring the individual defendant from committing further crimes), incapacitation (isolat-
ing criminals that are dangerous to society), and rehabilitation. See LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note
230, at 23-24; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1988) (listing purposes of federal criminal sentencing).
Although some of these additional rationales may or may not apply when the defendant is a local
government, the focus here is on what appear to be the most significant rationales underlying
criminal punishment-general deterrence and retribution.
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stigma is arguably what distinguishes criminal from civil remedies.232
Although tort remedies deter, they do so without imposing the stigma that is
unique to criminal sanctions. And although tort remedies obviously carry
some moral weight, they nonetheless lack the retributive force of criminal
sanctions. Thus, if a local government is to be an appropriate object of
criminal sanctions, it must also be an appropriate object of the stigma and
moral condemnation that accompanies such sanctions.
2 33
Professor Brent Fisse has described the ways in which stigma and
moral condemnation play a crucial role when the defendant is a business
corporation.234 In his words, "[w]hen people blame corporations, they are
not merely channeling aggression against a deodand or some other sym-
bolic object, they are condemning the fact that the people within the organi-
zation collectively failed to avoid the offense to which corporate blame
attaches. 235
232. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTMP. PROBS. 401,
404-05 (1958); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1967) (noting that "[i]t is disconcerting
* , that [the term 'delinquent'] has come to involve only slightly less stigma than the term
'criminal' applied to adults").
Judge Newman has long viewed criminal civil rights prosecutions of local officials as un-
wieldy and would replace them with Department of Justice-initiated civil actions against the en-
tity. See Newman, supra note 223, at 449-50, 455-58; Jon 0. Newman, How to Protect Other
Rodney Kings, N.Y. TimEs, May 1, 1992, at A35; Miranda S. Spivack, Hartford Judge Offers
Police Brutality Bill, HARTFoRD CouRANr, May 6, 1992, at Al. However, even if Judge Newman
is correct in his description of the practical problems involved in criminal civil rights prosecutions,
he falls to take account of the unique stigmatizing effects that criminal prosecutions offer. More-
over, at least one of the major problems with the criminal prosecution of governmental officials
that he identifies-namely, reluctance on the part of juries to convict individual police officers-
would likely be eliminated by the prosecution of the entity instead. See infra notes 268-69 and
accompanying text.
233. In Professor Friedmann's view, the answer was obvious:
At a time when government departments and many independent corporations, directly or
indirectly controlled by the government, assume an increasing variety of functions and
responsibilities in the social and economic life of nations, the exemption of either gov-
ernment or governmental corporations from criminal liability generally is neither mor-
ally nor technically justified.
FRmDMARN, supra note 15, at 26.
234. Fisse, supra note 231, at 1147-54.
235. Id. at 1149; see also Susan Hedman, Expressive Functions of Criminal Sanctions in Envi-
ronmental Law, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 889, 889 (1991) (arguing that the criminal law has a
"unique capacity" to "shame those who violate society's increasingly strict norms of environmen-
tal protection); Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Control of Criminal Conduct in Organizations, 71 B.U.
L. REv. 421, 431-32 (1991) (noting that "[tihe threat of a stigma resulting from a criminal convic-
tion may encourage an organization to take steps to prevent criminal behavior within the organiza-
tion"). But see Andres Cowan, Note, Scarlet Letters for Corporations? Punishment by Publicity
Under the New Sentencing Guidelines, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2387, 2389 n.1 1 (1992) ("Retributive
justice.., has generally been rejected as inappropriate in the context of corporations.... because
it is grounded in concepts of individual blameworthiness and responsibility that make little sense
when applied to organizations that lack mind and conscience.").
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A similar phenomenon would occur in the case of municipalities.
When individual municipal officials violate the law, they frequently do so
within a system of rules and norms established by the governmental entity
for which they work. To the extent that such wrongdoing is the result of
official policy, custom and usage, or collective and deliberate decision-
making, the appropriate object of moral condemnation should be the enter-
prise, rather than, or at least as much as, the individual official.236
A dramatic example of how government policy can lead to criminality
and justify moral condemnation of the governmental entity itself is pro-
vided by the facts of Webster v. City of Houston.2 37 As described at the
beginning of this article,23 Webster involved the Houston Police Depart-
ment's alleged policy of condoning the use of throw-down guns. In such
circumstances, condemnation of the governmental entity is likely to be at
least as strong as it is in the case of the individual defendants. As in the
case of "state-sponsored" terrorism 9 and war crimes,24 0 the fact that a
236. There exists a substantial body of law regarding the determination of when a deprivation
of federally protected rights is caused by action taken "pursuant to official municipal policy."
Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978). This Article does
not intend to offer a description of exactly when a criminal act would properly be considered the
result of municipal policy (rather than simply the act of an individual official who works for the
municipality). Such determinations would likely be consistent with those cases that have ad-
dressed similar issues in the area of civil rights tort law. See, e.g., Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475
U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986):
The conclusion that tortious conduct, to be the basis for municipal liability under
§ 1983, must be pursuant to a municipality's "official policy".. . was intended to distin-
guish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby
make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is
actually responsible. Monell reasoned that recovery from a municipality is limited to
acts that are, properly speaking, acts "of the municipality"-that is, acts which the mu-
nicipality has officially sanctioned or ordered.
See also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 652 (1980) (imposing liability against
municipality in case involving "'systemic' injuries that result not so much from the conduct of
any single individual, but from the interactive behavior of several government officials"); Colleen
R. Courtade, Annotation, What Constitutes Policy or Custom for Purposes of Determining Liabil-
ity of Local Government Unit Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983-Modem Cases, 81 A.L.R. FED. 549
(1987).
237. 689 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 735 F.2d 838 (5th Cir.) (per
curiam) (en banc), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 739 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (en
bane).
238. See supra notes 3-10 and accompanying text.
239. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PATr P'NS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 21-24
(1993) (detailing United Nations resolutions and other efforts to deal with state-sponsored interna-
tional terrorism).
240. See INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, DRAFr ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILrrY, Art.
19, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS CODIICATION OF STATE RESPONSIBILrrY 329 (Marina Spinedi &
Bruno Simma eds., 1987) ("An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a
State of an international obligation so essential for the protection of a fundamental interest of the
international community that its breach is recognized as a crime by that community as a whole
constitutes an international crime."). But see I MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
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governmental entity is the moving force behind the criminality makes it, in
the eyes of many, that much more threatening. 241 As Justice Brandeis
wrote, "If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for
law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy."
242
Such condemnation of the government entity would not be reserved
solely for dramatic and violent crimes. In United States v. Little Rock
Sewer Committee,243 for example, the defendant Sewer Committee was
charged with criminal violations of the Clean Water Act based on the fact
that the city's sewer plant manager, a "high level" government employee,
"knowingly" made material false statements in monthly discharge monitor-
ing reports. 2 " It would, of course, be disturbing if the plant manager had
failed to file the report simply because he was personally lazy or indolent.
It would be even more troubling, however, if his failure to file was the
result of city policy-if, for example, the Little Rock City Council had, in
an effort to save money, deprived its city sewer plant managers of the sup-
port staff necessary to prepare the required reports.
Indeed, municipalities are particularly susceptible to the effects of the
condemnation and stigma associated with criminal conviction. Local gov-
ernments mount major public relations efforts to promote civic pride and
ensure that their towns are perceived as clean, safe, productive, and stimu-
lating places to visit, live, work, and raise a family.2 45 Although it is diffi-
cult to predict exactly how a criminal conviction would affect the reputation
TIONAL LAW 52 (1963) (attributing to Nuremberg Tribunal the statement: "Crimes against inter-
national law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals
who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.").
241. Consider, for example, how much we are appalled by the fact that the Iranian Govern-
ment was behind the fatwah ordering the death of author Salman Rushdie.
242. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (involving
admissibility of evidence gained through illegal wiretap).
Because the appropriateness of such condemnation is considerably less clear when the de-
fendant entity is vicariously liable, municipalities should be held criminally liable only when high-
level officials have adopted policies that authorize or recklessly tolerate criminal conduct. Such a
policy also would be consistent with the doctrine that municipalities may not be held vicariously
liable in tort under § 1983. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
691-92 (1978).
243. 460 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
244. Id. at 9. An earlier information had named the City of Little Rock itself as a defendant,
but the court dismissed the charge on the grounds that the duty to submit the required reports
belonged to the Sewer Committee rather than the City. See id. at 7. After a one-day jury trial, the
Sewer Committee was found guilty and was placed on probation for a period of two years. See
Judgment and ProbationlCommitment Order, United States v. Little Rock Sewer Comm., 460 F.
Supp. 6 (E.D. Ark. 1978) (No. LR-CR-77-138) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
245. See, e.g., Stuart Elliott, Advertising: New York's Subway Puts its Problems on the Line in
a Campaign, N.Y. TiaEs, May 13, 1993, at D19; see also Kirk Johnson, "I Love Tourism": Three
States Try to Resume Luring Visitors, N.Y. TIMEs, May 13, 1993, at BI (discussing efforts by
New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut to boost tourism).
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of a city, effects could include a loss of confidence in local officials, a
decline in business and tax revenues, and falling real estate values and bond
ratings.246 Criminal conviction might also make it easier for civil plaintiffs
to sue.
On the other hand, it is important to note that the stigma attending
criminal prosecution need not-and probably would not-attach to the in-
dividual citizens who live in the city that is convicted of a crime. To say
that the Cities of Houston or Little Rock committed a crime no more entails
that every citizen, or even every government official, in Houston or Little
Rock is a "criminal" than to say that every stockholder or official of a con-
victed corporation is a criminal.24 7 Enterprise criminality is not, and need
not be, so reducible.
Of course, in at least some cases, the citizens of a given community
can be said to share in the guilt of their municipal government.248 Public
choice theorists have long emphasized that the smaller the community, the
more control its citizens have over its governance-be it through the ballot
box, town meetings, referenda, or voting "with their feet."249 This is not to
say that every citizen will agree with every policy that her town adopts. But
if a small town adopts policies that encourage environmental violations or
police brutality, it is probably fair to assume that the individual citizens of
the town have as much control over, and bear as much blame for, such
policies as a small shareholder or mid-level manager has in her company's
decision to violate the law. 50
246. The "fairness" aspects of this issue are discussed infra text accompanying notes 251-63.
247. See, e.g., United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238,242 (1st Cir.) (upholding conviction of
Mystic Fuel Corporation for fraud and stating that the company itself-"not the individual de-
fendant[ ) [employees]-was making money by selling oil that it had not paid foe'), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 991 (1982).
248. Cf. Webster v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 1220, 1237 (5th Cir. 1982) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) ("It is necessary that the threatened [punitive] damages cause some deprivation for
the populace so that they will be nudged out of their blissful ignorance .... ), vacated and
remanded, 735 F.2d 838 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (en banc), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 739 F.2d
993 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (en banc).
249. See VINCENT OSTROM Er AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNrrED STATES 206 (1988);
Briffault, supra note 2, at 400-01 (citing Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,
64 J. POL. EcoN. 416, 418 (1956)); see also Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and
Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86 MIcH. L. REv. 930, 944-45 (1988) (discussing
local citizens' ability to "vote with their feet").
250. The ascription of such "collective guilt" would also be consistent with a more general
trend in the law toward notions of group responsibility. See Robert A.B. Bush, Between Two
Worlds: The Shift from Individual to Group Responsibility in the Law of Causation of Injury, 33
UCLA L. REV. 1473, 1501-02 nn.96 & 97 (1986) (describing shift from individual to group re-
sponsibility in tort law, contract law, and civil procedure).
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B. Criminal Enterprise Liability and Fairness
Determining whether it is fair to make local governments the object of
criminal sanctions requires consideration of the following issues: (1)
whether such sanctions would unjustly impose an economic burden on
"blameless" or "innocent" taxpayers; (2) whether such fines would risk
bankrupting municipal governments; and (3) whether imposing criminal
sanctions on entities that are meant to benefit the public would be counter-
productive, because it would harm precisely those people who are meant to
be helped." 1 This section considers these "fairness" issues and suggests
that, contrary to first impressions, imposing criminal sanctions on local
governments would actually lead to greater fairness than imposing such
sanctions solely on governmental officials.
1. The Supposed Problem of "Blameless" Taxpayers, Potentially
Bankrupting Liability, and Harm to the People Whose Interests
Are Meant to Be Protected
Modem tort law provides that when a municipality acts negligently,
and such negligence causes injury, the municipality is obligated to pay
compensation to a plaintiff 52 Obviously, the burden of paying damages in
such cases is borne by the town's taxpayers and by those who would have
benefitted from programs that could have been paid for with funds that
must instead be used to pay such damages. This occurs regardless of
whether these citizens approve of the governmental policy that leads or con-
tributes to liability.
From this perspective, then, there is nothing anomalous about making
"blameless" 53 taxpayers pay for the wrongs of their government. To the
extent that some citizens suffer a small injustice when their municipality is
251. The Supreme Court offered similar arguments for immunizing municipalities from puni-
tive damage liability in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981).
Several lower courts have also cited such arguments in cases involving the possibility of subject-
ing municipalities to civil RICO damages. See, e.g., Lancaster Community Hosp. v. Antelope
Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 404 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The 'body politic,' that is, the taxpayers,
will pay if [plaintiff's] RICO claim is successful. Yet the 'body politic' was the target of the
deception perpetrated."), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1168 (1992).
252. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text; see also Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacramento
Municipal Util. Dist., 526 F. Supp. 276, 281 (E.D. Cal. 1981) (stating that "[tihe day is long past
when it was thought that mere status as a public entity was a sufficient basis upon which to require
a tort victim to bear his own damages" and thus maintaining that municipality may be held liable
for antitrust treble damages).
253. The "blameless taxpayers and citizens" concept distinguishes municipalities from busi-
ness corporations, whose managers and shareholders have, in a more obvious way, voluntarily
undertaken the risk of criminal and civil liability. Cf. Henry W. Edgerton, Corporate Criminal




required to pay tort damages, it is an injustice that we are willing to accept
in the pursuit of the overriding policy goal of compensation. Similarly,
when the policy goal is that of deterring or obtaining retribution for crimi-
nal behavior, and such criminal behavior is the result of a municipal policy,
it seems reasonable to conclude that society would tolerate the small injus-
tice that comes from the possibility that some of those bearing the burden of
the criminal fine might be blameless.
The potential fiscal impact of criminal fines also should not be overes-
timated. There is little evidence that such fines are any more likely to bank-
rupt a town than civil fines or compensatory civil damages.2"4 There is
even less indication that criminal fines would hurt a municipality as much
as the imposition of punitive damages, a burden that the Supreme Court has
called "unmanageable." 5
Finally, the argument that federal criminal prosecution of local govern-
ments would hurt precisely the people whose interests are meant to be vin-
dicated is, at best, overstated. The federal criminal laws are intended to
protect the interests of a far broader constituency than that which is penal-
ized when a local government is prosecuted. The crimes that local govern-
ments commit frequently hurt people who live and work outside the local
polity as well.256
Moreover, a citizen who must bear some fraction of the costs of the
criminal sanction imposed on his municipality might be quite willing to do
so if it means the opportunity to live in a "crime-free" municipality. In-
deed, it is possible that those most likely to benefit from the deterrent effect
of criminal sanctions on municipalities-i.e., those most likely to be injured
if the municipality engages in police brutality, environmental pollution, or
price fixing-would shoulder a comparatively small share of the higher
254. For example, under the Clean Water Act, a municipality that knowingly fails to file a
monthly discharge report is subject to a criminal fine of not less than $5,000 and not more than
$50,000 per day of violation. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (1988). By contrast, municipalities found
negligent in tort for causing serious bodily injury or death to a plaintiff are frequently assessed
hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of dollars in damages. See infra note 269. On the other
hand, one should consider that, while defendants generally can insure against civil damages, they
are usually prevented by public policy from insuring against criminal fines and punitive damages.
See, e.g., Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 441-42 (5th Cir. 1962)
(holding that public policy prohibits construction of insurance policy as covering liability for both
punitive damages and criminal fines). A full accounting of the impact of criminal sanctions would
also have to include the financial effects of lost confidence in a city government. See supra notes
245-46 and accompanying text.
255. City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 265. In at least four different places in that opinion, the
Court expressed concern that punitive damages would pose a serious risk to the financial integrity
of local governmental entities. Id. at 265, 266, 270, 271.
256. Cf. Briffault, supra note 2, at 429 (pointing out that decisions by local governments often
impose costs on people outside the local polity).
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taxes, reduced public services, and depressed business climate that result
from criminal conviction.
2. Fairness and Retribution
Those who favor the retribution theory of punishment contend that it
"'provides an important check against tyranny, for a person is punished
only when he deserves it; and the opposite is also true-that he is not pun-
ished if he does not deserve it.' "I' Crucial to this view of punishment is
the idea that the criminal laws must be applied consistently and fairly. If
wealthy and well-connected defendants receive lighter criminal sanctions
than poor and politically powerless defendants, the integrity of the criminal
justice system suffers.2"' Similarly, the system suffers if an individual de-
fendant becomes a scapegoat for the wrongs of a larger criminal enterprise
of which he is only a small part.2 9 At its most basic level, the retribution
principle says that the person or entity that is truly to blame for a crime
should be the one to suffer the punishment, and that such punishment
should be proportional to the degree of the harm the crime has caused and
the degree of the defendant's guilt.260 Thus, in those cases such as Web-
ster,26 1 in which the crimes of individual officials are committed within the
context of broader-based governmental policies that either authorize or tol-
erate such illegality, it seems fairer to address the criminal sanction to the
governmental entity rather than, or in addition to, the responsible official.
Such consistency in enforcement benefits the defendant entity as well.
Criminal defendants are guaranteed certain rights that defendants in civil
proceedings are not.262 Commentators have long criticized the practice of
257. LAFAVE & Sco-rr, supra note 230, at 26 (quoting PHILIP BEAN, PUNISHMENT 19 (1981)).
258. See, e.g., Jill Dut, Milken Justice: Some Say It's Unusual But Not Cruel Enough, N.Y.
NEWSDAY, Mar. 1, 1992, at 69 (reporting reaction to news that convicted financier Michael
Milken would retain hundreds of millions of dollars in assets after sentencing); Floyd Norris,
Market Watch: On Wall Street, Some Crooks Get off Easy, N.Y. TIaMs, Oct. 3, 1993, at 3-1
(arguing that it is unfair that those who violate criminal laws involving the securities industry
receive much lighter sentences than others); cf. People v. City of Chicago, 100 N.E. 194, 196 (Il1.
1912) (involving the state criminal prosecution of a municipality):
It would be a peculiar condition of affairs if a state could exact obedience from its
citizens, fine and imprison them for violations of law, and at the same time be powerless
to secure obedience to the same laws by the entity which derived its being from the state
itself. To obtain this result there is no weapon so effective as criminal procedure by way
of indictment.
259. See, e.g., Ken Wells, Lawyer for Exxon Valdez Captain Calls Him Scapegoat, Victim of
Crew Mistakes, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 1990, at A6 (describing trial of Exxon Valdez Captain Joseph
Hazelwood).
260. See supra note 231.
261. See supra notes 3-10 and accompanying text.
262. These include the right to indictment, counsel, speedy trial, and proof beyond a reason-
able doubt, as well as protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, self-incrimination,
double jeopardy, and excessive fines. Some of these protections undoubtedly are less important in
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denying defendants these rights by combatting what are essentially criminal
violations through civil means.263 Criminal prosecution of local govern-
ments in appropriate cases would thus ensure that such entities receive all
of the rights to which criminal defendants are constitutionally guaranteed.
C. Criminal Enterprise Liability and Efficiency
A final set of justifications for imposing criminal sanctions on govern-
mental entities rather than officials centers on efficiency. Analogous argu-
ments have been developed extensively in the literature on criminal liability
for business corporations 2" and in the literature on tort liability for
municipalities.265
As in the case of business corporations, imposing liability on the gov-
ernmental enterprise obviates the difficulty of determining which govern-
mental employees are primarily responsible for the entity's wrongdoing.
As Judge Goldberg asked in his concurrence in Webster:
[A]t whom do we point the finger of guilt in the case of tragic
collective apathy? At the individual police officers who knew of
the policy but did nothing? The instructors at the police academy
who allowed this horrible technique to be inculcated at the very
time adherence to law and the Constitution and fundamental
human morality should have been taught? The police chief? The
city council? The citizens snug in their beds, oblivious to the fact
that young men were being shot down by their "protectors"?
2 66
In many cases involving municipal wrongdoing, deciding which individuals
within an entity should be held responsible will present difficult problems
of both proof and moral judgment. By naming a police department, sewer
the case of non-corporeal defendants, such as business corporations and local governmental enti-
ties. See Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41
HAsT. L. REv. 577, 622 (1990).
263. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants in
Civil Penalty Cases, 59 CoRNELL L. Rv. 478, 480 (1974); Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits
on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending
the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HAsr. L.J. 1325, 1348-69 (1991); Coffee, Paradigms,
supra note 20, at 1887-90; Abraham S. Goldstein, White-Collar Crime and Civil Sanctions, 101
YALE L.J. 1895, 1898-99 (1992); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground
Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1864-72 (1992); Franklin E. Zimring, The
Multiple Middlegrounds Between Civil and Criminal Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1901 passim (1992);
George Fletcher, Comment, The Concept of Punitive Legislation and the Sixth Amendment: A New
Look at Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 32 U. Cm. L. RPv. 290 passim (1965); Note, Civil RICO
Is a Misnomer: The Need for Criminal Procedural Protections in Actions Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964, 100 HAiv. L. REv. 1288, 1301-05 (1987).
264. See supra note 215.
265. See supra note 223.
266. Webster v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 1220, 1236 (Goldberg, J., concurring), vacated and
remanded, 735 F.2d 838 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (en banc), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 739 F.2d
993 (5th 1984) (per curiam) (en banc).
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committee, municipal hospital, or a city itself-rather than any individu-
als-as the defendant, these quandaries can be avoided and, as a practical
matter, the costs of investigation and prosecution can be reduced.267
A second reason for prosecuting local governments rather than the of-
ficials who work for them is that the former may be more likely to be con-
victed. It has frequently been observed in the corporate crime context that
juries are more willing to convict a corporate entity than the responsible
individual officials. 268 A similar phenomenon might occur when the de-
fendant is, say, an individual governmental official with no previous crimi-
nal record, a history of public service, and a family to support.269
267. Cf. Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Control of Criminal Conduct in Organizations, 71 B.U. L.
REv. 421,425-28 (1991) (noting that the benefits of prosecuting organization alone include reduc-
ing the costs of investigating and convicting, increasing the likelihood of conviction, and avoiding
procedural problems).
268. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 411 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941); United States v. Austin Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 233 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 279 U.S. 863 (1929); see also Christopher Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in
the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE LJ. 1, 32-33 nn.127-28 (1980) (describing pattern of
judicial leniency toward corporate executives convicted of antitrust violations).
269. In City of Newport, the Court noted that the jury's $200,000 award against the city was
more than twice the total amount of punitive damages assessed against the individual defendant
city officials collectively. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 n.32 (1981);
see also Newman, supra note 232, at A35 ("[I]n all police misconduct trials, there is an inevitable
reluctance on the part of ordinary citizens to brand a law enforcement officer as a criminal."). It is
unclear which is the more significant cause of this reluctance, however: the fact that the defendant
is an individual, or the fact that the defendant is a member of the police force.
One can also anticipate a contrary argument. Federal criminal defendants are constitutionally
guaranteed the right to have their cases tried to a jury in the district in which the offense was
allegedly committed. See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. Therefore, a
federal jury hearing a criminal case against a municipal defendant would probably include at least
some jurors who were citizens of the municipality. (Federal judicial districts are frequently larger
than municipalities, so in many cases some of the jurors would come from neighboring municipal-
ities as well.) Federal prosecutors thus would be in the uncomfortable position of having to ask
some jurors to convict the very municipality in which those jurors live and pay taxes. Although
this certainly raises a troublesome issue, there is no indication that the problem is any more signif-
icant than it is when jurors are asked to impose civil damages on a municipality in which they are
resident-something that juries in large cities recently have been quite willing to do. See, e.g.,
Margaret Cronin Fisk, 1993's Largest Verdicts, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 17, 1994, at S15 (citing Marmol
v. City of New York, 7918-1991 (Sup. Ct., New York Co.) (June 2, 1993) (New York City jury
awarding plaintiff $100.57 million verdict in suit against city of New York)); Hawkins v. District
of Columbia, 91-15515 (Super. Ct. Washington, D.C.) (Nov. 15, 1993) (Washington, D.C. jury
awarding plaintiff $6 million verdict in suit against District of Columbia); Ferber v. City of Phila-
delphia, July Term 1986, No. 4696 (Ct. C.P. Phila.) (Sept. 28, 1993) (Philadelphia jury awarding
plaintiff $4.5 million in suit against city); McCummings v. New York City Transit Authority,
9494/85 (Sup. Ct. New York Co.) (March 8, 1990) (Manhattan jury awarding plaintiff $4.34
million in suit against New York City), aft'd, 580 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1st Dept. 1992), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 548 (1993)); John Murawski, District Slumps Under Liability Strain, LrGAL TiMES,
Aug. 30, 1993, at 1 (reporting on $4.9 million verdict against District of Columbia awarded by
jury made up of District residents). On the other hand, it is worth recalling that criminal convic-
tion requires a unanimous verdict, whereas civil judgment requires only a majority.
MUNICIPAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY
A final policy reason for imposing criminal sanctions on municipal
entities rather than individual employees is that such a policy would en-
courage the enterprise to adopt efficient internal policies and controls in-
tended to deter malfeasance, without undue deterrence of socially beneficial
conduct. Indeed, the efficiency-enhancing role of enterprise liability as ap-
plied to municipalities (in the civil context) has been embraced both by
numerous commentators270 and by the Supreme Court on several significant
occasions, 271 despite its unwillingness to do so in City of Newport.272 As
with business corporations, 273 a municipality threatened with the stigma and
monetary penalty associated with criminal conviction would likely seek to
"rehabilitate" itself, so as to repair its image and regain public confidence.
IV. CONCLUSION
Federal prosecutors should consider bringing criminal charges against
municipal entities that systematically encourage or tolerate criminal behav-
ior. Such prosecutions would not be without precedent. In the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, imposing criminal sanctions on local govern-
ments was widely viewed as a means of vindicating public fights. Today,
in those cases in which criminal actions are the result of a concerted gov-
ernmental policy, rather than simply the action of an individual official,
federal criminal prosecution of local governments should be viewed as a
more fair, efficient, and effective alternative to either criminal prosecution
of local officials or civil suits against the entity.
Moreover, a basic federal statutory scheme for prosecuting municipali-
ties is already in place. Most federal criminal environmental laws, for ex-
270. See, e.g., SCHUCK, supra note 65, passim; Baxter, supra note 223, passim; Cass, supra
note 190, at 1174-1184; Mashaw, supra note 223, passim.
271. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 652 (1980) (stating that imposing
liability on the governmental entity encourages it "to institute internal rules and programs"
designed to prevent its employees from engaging in the conduct at issue); Monell v. New York
City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
272. In declining to uphold the imposition of punitive damages on the defendant municipality,
the City of Newport Court stated, in a conclusory fashion, that: (1) imposing such damages proba-
bly would not deter individual officials from wrongdoing; (2) imposing such damages directly
against officials would serve as a more effective deterrent; and (3) a deterrent effect was already
present through existing sanctions, such as public reaction and reprimand from superiors. 453
U.S. at 269-70. Yet, the Court offered no argument for distinguishing this case from its earlier
decisions in Owen and Monell, and, indeed, did not even acknowledge that there might be a
conflict.
In his concurrence in the Webster case, Judge Goldberg offered a compelling argument that,
contrary to what the Court in Newport stated, imposing punitive damages on the municipal entity
is precisely the appropriate remedy when it is the entity's policies that are to blame for the wrong-
doing. See Webster v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 1220, 1236-38 (5th Cir. 1982) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring), vacated and remanded, 735 F.2d 838 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (en banc), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 739 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (en banc).
273. See Fisse, supra note 231, at 1154.
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ample, expressly include municipalities within the definition of "persons"
subject to prosecution. Federal criminal antitrust and civil rights laws can
also reasonably be construed to apply to municipalities. Certainly, where
gaps in the statutory scheme exist, Congress should consider enacting laws
that would bridge them. Finally, although municipal immunity from prose-
cution might exist in certain limited circumstances, there appears to be no
broader-based immunity that would protect municipalities from federal
criminal prosecution more generally.
